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Using Recreation Facility Fees, Wrongfully, to Equip and Operate Facilities For Regional Transportation The District Has No Power to Furnish

IVGID 101 Posted on by

As demonstrated elsewhere, the purpose for general improvement districts (“GIDs”) is supposed to be “to provide various urban type services1 (to real property2 in)…areas where such services (a)re not available and (cannot) be provided (for) by general purpose government(s)”3 such as counties, cities and unincorporated towns4. Okay, what types of services? Those provided by the Legislature5 as explicitly conferred in the GID’s initiating ordinance6 as supplemented, if at all, by those “additional basic power(s expressly) granted,”7 “sections of this chapter (NRS 318) designated therein,”8 and none other9. 

Yet for decades unelected staff and “rubber stamp” trustees have taken the position that because IVGID “is a legally separate government…fiscally independent of any other governmental entity…(it is somehow) not financially accountable (to) any other entity,”10 and it is “empowered to determine what facilities and services it should offer”11 even though oftentimes GIDs: “do not have the adequate size or tax base to (financially) support th(os)e services;”12 NRS 318.055(4)(c)(2) expressly declares that a GID’s “initiating ordinance must set forth…a statement that the ordinance creating the district will be based on the (county) board (of commissioner)’s finding…that the creation of the district is economically sound and feasible;” and here specifically, IVGID does not have the adequate size nor tax base to (financially) support the services it furnishes and its furnishing of those services is not economically sound. Stated differently, past trustees have taken the position, contrary to Dillon’s Rule13, that unless the exercise of a power is expressly prohibited by NRS 318, they are free to exercise it!

And based upon this belief, the District operates a regional transportation fleet consisting of a nearly $768,000 of vehicles [two (2) 2010 36-passenger shuttle buses14 valued at $175,000/each15, a 2023 14-passenger shuttle van valued at nearly $141,70016, a 1991 ski passenger tram valued at $22,70017, a 1993 ski passenger tram valued at $23,40017, two (2) 2007 4WD tram trucks valued at $50,000 each15, a 2017 Dodge Caravan mini-van valued at $53,00018, a 2017 Chevrolet compact SUV valued at $32,00019, and a 2012 15-passenger van valued at $45,80019] used to transport members of the general public. Now before we go further, please understand the District neither acknowledges it maintains nor operates a regional transportation system, nor the particulars thereof. Nor does it provide ala carte financial reporting associated with the costs it incurs equipping and operating such a system. So members of the public are forced to sift through the District’s records and financial reporting to piece together what we’ve pieced together here. Nevertheless, we feel we can state with a high degree of confidence that this system actually exists20, it is available to be used by the general public as a whole, and the District loses quite a bit of money equipping and operating the same21. Which like nearly everything else the public’s staff administer, requires a financial subsidy from somewhere. And that somewhere ends up being the Recreation (“RFF”) and Beach (“BFF”) Facility Fees which are involuntarily assessed against all non-exempt parcels/dwelling units within IVGID’s boundaries.

So the question: Does the District have the power to equip and operate a regional transportation system? For the reasons which follow, we say no!

“The (GID’s) Initiating Ordinance Must Set Forth…a Statement of The Basic Power or Basic Powers For Which The District is Proposed to be Created: (for instance, by way of illustration, ‘for paving, curb and gutters, sidewalks, storm drainage and sanitary sewer improvements within the district’).”6 As elsewhere discussed, the District’s initiating ordinance did not grant it the basic power to furnish facilities for and to operate a regional transportation system.

Moreover, “The Basic Power or Basic Powers Stated in The (GID’s) Initiating Ordinance Must be One or More of Those Authorized in NRS 318.116:”6 Take a look at NRS 318.116 and show us where GIDs are expressly permitted to furnish facilities for a regional transportation system. As elsewhere discussed, NRS 318.116 does not expressly identify providing a regional transportation system as a basic power a GID may exercise.

A GID’s “Board May Elect to Add Basic Powers Not Provided in Its Formation, in which event it shall cause proceedings to be had by the board of county commissioners similar, as nearly as may be, to those provided for the formation of the district, and with like effect.”7 Assuming arguendo the furnishing of a regional transportation system were a basic power a GID could exercise, show us where the Washoe County Board has expressly granted this basic power to the District, let alone via “proceedings…as nearly as may be, to those provided for the formation of the district, and with like effect”22 given such grant in a GID’s initiating3 or supplemental4 ordinance(s) is a pre-condition before it can be exercised. In both instances the answer is nowhere! Additionally, the Washoe County Board has never approved “a modified service plan for the district in a manner like that provided for an initial service plan required for the organization of a district in the Special District Control Law.”7

“Sections of This Chapter (NRS 318) Designated Therein:”6 Examine NRS 318. Nowhere else will the reader find that a GID may exercise the power to furnish a regional transportation system. Yes NRS 318.210 states that a GID “board shall have and exercise all rights and powers necessary or incidental to or implied from the specific powers granted in this chapter.” So what “specific powers (have been) granted in…chapter” NRS 318 which allegedly dictate that the power to equip and operate a regional transportation system is “necessary or incidental to or (to be) implied” therefrom? And assuming you the reader can come up with any, would you not admit you have some doubt? Because if you do, we harken back to Dillon’s Rule which as the reader will recall instructs “that if there is any fair or reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a power, that doubt is (to be) resolved against the (governing board of the local government) and the power is denied.”23

NRS 277A.170: This statute gives County Boards of Commissioners the power “by ordinance (to) create a regional transportation commission.” Once created, NRS 277A.270(1) instructs that only “a (regional transportation) commission may operate a system of public transportation to the exclusion of any other publicly owned system of transportation within its area of jurisdiction.” Given the Washoe County Board has created the Regional Transportation Commission (“RTC”) which “serves (public transportation to) the citizens of Reno and Sparks along with unincorporated areas of Washoe County,”24 IVGID has no power to operate any system of public transportation within Washoe County!  

Attorney General Opinion 2005-01: (January 21, 2005). Although we’re not aware of any court case which has ruled on the propriety of a GID regional transportation system, we are aware of this Nevada Office of Attorney General’s (“OAG’s”) Opinion which instructs that the powers granted to local government are “in the nature of a public trust that may not be exercised…in the absence of statutory authorization.”13 Therefore without statutory authority, GIDs have no power to equip or operate a regional transportation system! And since they have no such power, the same OAG opinion instructs they have no power to delegate such powers to their GM nor anyone else for that matter25.

Summary: So if this basic power is not provided by the Legislature for GIDs, it has not been expressly granted to the District by the Washoe County Board, and NRS 277A.270(1) prohibits IVGID from operating a system of public transportation within the county’s boundaries, where do staff get off operating the same?

The District’s Funding Source: Given staff are unable to equip and operate its regional transportation system on a revenue neutral or positive cash flow basis, the financial deficiency is subsidized by the RFF26.

The Districts Wrongful Use of the RFF: Although NRS 318.197(1) instructs that a GID “Board may fix…(various) rates, tolls or charges other than special assessments,” nowhere are regional transportation system costs expressly included in the litany of permissible fees. Our What Are The RFF/BFF discussion explains that according to staff and the Board, the RFF represents “Recreation Standby and Service Charges [also known as the Recreation…and Beach Facility Fee(s)27…for the (mere) availability of use of the recreational facilities described”28 in the “written report29 (for collection on the county tax roll which is)…filed (each year) with the secretary.” So do the fees necessary to equip and operate a regional transportation system have anything to do with “recreation standby and service charges…for the (mere) availability of use of the (District’s) recreational facilities?”

Moreover, equipping and operating a regional transportation system which serves the general public as a whole is not economically feasible30 inasmuch as staff is required to involuntarily assess local parcel/dwelling unit owners nearly $7 million in financial subsidies, just to be able to pass a balanced budget which includes the operational and capital costs associated with that system! Therefore following Dillon’s Rule, the fact of the matter is that the District has no power to furnish facilities for nor operating a public regional transportation system.

The District’s Justification for exercising powers it does not have: We believe there is none. However, if you’d like to consider the Board’s/staff’s perceived justification, staff offer three (3) justifications. First, ¶II of Resolution 148031 and Policy 3.1.05(f)32 authorize staff because the IVGID Board has abdicated away essentially all powers to manage, control and supervise the business and affairs of the district, as well as to improve, equip, operate and maintain all district projects33 to unelected staff.

Second, NRS 318.210 which states “the board shall have and exercise all rights and powers necessary or incidental to or implied from the specific powers granted in this chapter.” Here staff contend that operating a intra-regional transportation system is a necessary, incidental or implied right from the specific powers granted in NRS 318. But is it really? Is it a “power…necessarily implied or necessarily incident to the powers expressly granted” by the County Board? Is it a “power…absolutely essential…not simply convenient, but indispensable…to (IVGID’s)…declared objects and purposes?” The answer to all of these questions is a resounding no!

Moreover, this justification runs afoul of Dillon’s Rule34. Given NRS 318.210 is really the statutory embodiment of the second portion of Dillon’s Rule (“a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise…those…powers…necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted”), should there be “any fair or reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a power, that doubt is (supposed to be) resolved against the (governing) board…and the power (is)…denied.”35 So is there doubt?

Finally, because staff can. According to staff (just ask them) IVGID “is a legally separate government…fiscally independent of any other governmental entity…(and) not financially accountable (to) any other entity.”36 Similarly, Washoe County takes the same position37. So who’s going to stop staff from exercising a power it is not empowered to exercise?

Moreover, here equipping and operating a regional transportation system which serves the general public as a whole is not economically feasible30 inasmuch as staff is required to involuntarily assess local parcel/dwelling unit owners a whopping $7 million or more annually in financial subsidies, just to be able to pass a balanced budget which includes the operational and capital costs associated with that system! Therefore following Dillon’s Rule, the fact of the matter is that the District has no power to furnish facilities for “public transportation.”

As demonstrated elsewhere, the purpose for general improvement districts (“GIDs”) is supposed to be “to provide various urban type services1 (to real property2 in)…areas where such services (a)re not available and (cannot) be provided (for) by general purpose government(s)”3 such as counties, cities and unincorporated towns4. Okay, what types of services? Those provided by the Legislature5 as explicitly conferred in the GID’s initiating ordinance6 as supplemented, if at all, by those “additional basic power(s expressly) granted,”7 “sections of this chapter (NRS 318) designated therein,”8 and none other9. 

Yet for decades unelected staff and “rubber stamp” trustees have taken the position that because IVGID “is a legally separate government…fiscally independent of any other governmental entity…(it is somehow) not financially accountable (to) any other entity,”10 and it is “empowered to determine what facilities and services it should offer”38 even though oftentimes GIDs: “do not have the adequate size or tax base to (financially) support th(os)e services;”12 NRS 318.055(4)(c)(2) expressly declares that a GID’s “initiating ordinance must set forth…a statement that the ordinance creating the district will be based on the (county) board (of commissioner)’s finding…that the creation of the district is economically sound and feasible;” and here specifically, IVGID does not have the adequate size nor tax base to (financially) support the services it furnishes and its furnishing of those services is not economically sound. Stated differently, past trustees have taken the position, contrary to Dillon’s Rule13, that unless the exercise of a power is expressly prohibited by NRS 318, they are free to exercise it!

So the question: Does the District have the power to acquire real property for “open space” purposes? For the reasons which follow, we say no!

“The (GID’s) Initiating Ordinance Must Set Forth…a Statement of The Basic Power or Basic Powers For Which The District is Proposed to be Created: (for instance, by way of illustration, ‘for paving, curb and gutters, sidewalks, storm drainage and sanitary sewer improvements within the district’).”6 As elsewhere discussed, the District’s initiating ordinance did not grant it the basic power to furnish facilities for “open space.”

Moreover, “The Basic Power or Basic Powers Stated in The (GID’s) Initiating Ordinance Must be One or More of Those Authorized in NRS 318.116:”6 As elsewhere discussed, NRS 318.116 does not expressly identify providing “open space” as a basic power a GID may exercise.

A GID’s “Board May Elect to Add Basic Powers Not Provided in its Formation, in which event the board shall cause proceedings to be had by the board of county commissioners similar, as nearly as may be, to those provided for the formation of the district, and with like effect.”7 Even if providing “open space” were a basic power a GID could exercise, the Washoe County Board has never granted this power to the District, let alone via “proceedings…as nearly as may be, to those provided for the formation of the district, and with like effect.”22 Additionally, the Washoe County Board has never approved “a modified service plan for the district in a manner like that provided for an initial service plan required for the organization of a district in the Special District Control Law.”7

“Sections of This Chapter (NRS 318) Designated Therein:”6 Examine NRS 318. Nowhere else will the reader find that a GID may exercise the power to acquire real property for “open space” purposes. Yes NRS 318.210 states that a GID “board shall have and exercise all rights and powers necessary or incidental to or implied from the specific powers granted in this chapter.” So what “specific powers (have been) granted in…chapter” NRS 318 which allegedly dictate that the power to acquire real property for “open space” is “necessary or incidental to or (to be) implied” therefrom? And assuming you the reader can come up with any, would you not admit that you have some doubt? Because if you do, we harken back to Dillon’s Rule which as the reader will recall instructs “that if there is any fair or reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a power, that doubt is (to be) resolved against the (governing board of the local government) and the power is denied.”23

Attorney General Opinion 2005-01: (January 21, 2005). Although we’re not aware of any court case which has ruled on the propriety of a GID’s acquisition of real property for “open space” purposes, we are aware of this Nevada Office of Attorney General’s (“OAG’s”) Opinion which instructs that the powers granted to local government are “in the nature of a public trust that may not be exercised…in the absence of statutory authorization.”13 Therefore without statutory authority, GIDs have no power to acquire real property for “open space” purposes! And since they have no such power, the same OAG opinion instructs they have no power to delegate such powers to their GM nor anyone else for that matter39 instructs that “a  municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation – not simply convenient, but indispensable…Neither the corporation nor its officers can do any act, (n)or make any contract, (n)or incur any liability, not authorized thereby, (n)or by some legislative act applicable thereto. (And) all acts beyond the scope of the powers granted are void” (Id., at 57 Nev. 343).[/efn_note].

NRS 318.160: states that a GID “board shall have the power to acquire40…real…property, and any interest therein.” But does this authority extend to acquiring property for purposes a GID is not expressly authorized to exercise? For the reasons which follow, we answer no.

Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius: Consider that NRS 318.1172(2) instructs that a GID “board shall have the power to…purchase…real property…and other interests in (real) property…as necessary for the establishment, control, management and operation of (an) area or zone…for the preservation of one or more species or subspecies of wildlife that has been declared endangered or threatened pursuant to the federal Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§1531, et seq.” And NRS 318.142 instructs that a GID “board shall have the power to acquire (real property)…for the disposal of garbage and refuse, and to own and operate equipment for the collection and disposal of, and collect and dispose of, garbage and refuse.” In both instances, the power to acquire real property is conditioned upon some specific purpose expressly authorized by NRS 318.116. But here staff want us to believe the District may acquire real property for “open space,” notwithstanding this is not a purpose expressly authorized by NRS 318.116. Such an interpretation violates the common law maxim41 for construing legislation42, expressio unius est exclusio alterius43. In other words, since NRS 318.1172(2) and NRS 318.142 pre-condition the exercise of the power to acquire real property upon a purpose expressly authorized by NRS 318.116, and when it comes to “open space” there is no such authorization, the IVGID Board is precluded from acquiring real property for such purpose.

Evidence The District Has Acquired or Attempted to Acquire Real Property Allegedly For “Open Space“ Purposes: When the Bitterbrush Condominium project was first developed in the late 1990s, apparently eighty-seven (87) or so lots were approved by Washoe County without concurrent approval from TRPA. This made the lots unbuildable. And as a result, the owner(s) stopped paying ad valorem property taxes. Eventually title to these lots reverted to the County as a result of delinquent tax sales. Apparently there is a NRS provision that allows local governments to ask the County to transfer such parcels to the former if used for “open space” purposes. Apparently in/about/immediately preceding October of 2012, District staff made request that these lots be transferred to IVGID. In connection with that request, staff represented that these undeveloped lots, if acquired, would be used for “open space” purposes. This request was apparently granted by the Washoe County Board of Commissioners and as a result, title to the eighty-seven (87) or so lots was transferred to IVGID sometime in 2012.

Thereafter IVGID staff revealed their true intent in acquiring these lots. And it had nothing to do with “open space.” Since these lots were entitled to beach access, a market for their purchase existed even if not developable. Especially from owners of Crystal Bay properties who are denied beach access. So rather than retention for public “open space” purposes, District staff began selling them off to Crystal Bay property owners without the IVGID Board’s knowledge or approval. And by the time the public learned of what was going on, at least three (3) such lots had been sold for between $14,000-$20,000 each.

Currently (latter 2023), IVGID staff have made application for two parcels owned by the United States Forest Service. One of these parcels is located across from the High School, and the other is apparently located behind Pet Network. These parcels are apparently part of the Truckee Meadows Public Lands Management Act bill introduced by Senator Jacky Rosen in early 2023. And why do staff want these parcels? “Open space” and “fire mitigation” purposes.

The District’s Funding Source: At least insofar as the District’s acquisition of the eighty-seven (87) lots above-referenced, the RFF was used to pay the County its delinquent ad valorem taxes waived. When the County learned that District staff had sold the above-three (lots), and wanted the discretion to sell part/all of the remaining eighty-four (84), it insisted the District pay all delinquent ad valorem taxes waived.

The Districts Wrongful Use of the RFF: Although NRS 318.197(1) instructs that a GID “Board may fix…(various) rates, tolls or charges other than special assessments,” nowhere are real property acquisition costs expressly included in the litany of permissible fees. Our What Are The RFF/BFF discussion explains that according to staff and the Board, the RFF represents “Recreation Standby and Service Charges [also known as the Recreation…and Beach Facility Fee(s)27…for the (mere) availability of use of the recreational facilities described”28 in the “written report29 (for collection on the county tax roll which is)…filed (each year) with the secretary.” So do the fees necessary to pay for the County for delinquent ad valorem taxes waived on the eighty-seven (87) lots above-referenced have anything to do with “recreation standby and service charges…for the (mere) availability of use of the (District’s) recreational facilities?” How about real property the District has no power to acquire?

NRS 205.300(1): In order to further demonstrate that staff’s use of the RFF to acquire real property for “open space” purposes is impermissible, one needs to understand those sums get deposited into a single account44. Thus as far as staff are concerned, the money is available to be spent on whatever. And spent it is!

Therefore we submit that using the RFF to acquire real property for “open space” purposes is a violation of NRS 205.300(1)45. So where exactly do staff get off using funds collected as a bailee for completely different purposes to pay for real property the District has no power to acquire?

Moreover, Rather Than Specially Benefiting Just Those Parcels/Dwelling Units Which Are Assessed, Real Property For “Open Space” Purposes Benefits The General Public as a Whole: Open space benefits all residents, inhabitants, property owners, businesses, visitors, and real properties46 in our community. In other words, these alleged benefits are not limited to only District owned property. Therefore, “the (RFF)…levied…(by IVGID can)not survive scrutiny under the first prong of (the)…Medeiros test47 because the (open space furnished)…directly benefit(s)…the public-at-large — (and) not (just) th(os)e…who pay the (fees) inasmuch as the public at large is the primary beneficiary.”48

The District’s Justification for exercising powers it does not have: We believe there is none. However, if you’d like to consider the Board’s/staff’s perceived justification, you’re directed to our Staff’s/the Board’s Justification For Exceeding the Limited Powers the District May Permissibly Exercise web page.

Conclusion: So there you go. The issue we raise isn’t whether open space is a good thing. But rather, whether IVGID had/has the express power to acquire real property for such purposes. Moreover, rather than charging these costs to the District’s General Fund, they were/are discriminatorily paid by the RFF local parcel/dwelling unit owners must pay/guaranty. Finally, whatever benefit open space furnishes, accrues to the general public as a whole whether or not any single beneficiary is the one paying the fee. Thus for the above-reasoning, it is our opinion it was and is a misuse of NRS 318.055(4)(b) as well as Dillon’s Rule13 for IVGID to have acquired real property for “open space” purposes, and the District had no power to assess the RFF for this purpose simply because “the ends justify the means.”

  1. GIDs are authorized to “furnish services pertaining to any such basic power…the district may (permissibly) exercise” [see NRS 318.100(2)].
  2. Consider that: NRS 318.258(9) instructs the services a GID “provide(s are those)…required by the owners of…real property;” NRS 318.197(2) instructs that “all rates, tolls or charges (adopted shall) constitute a perpetual lien on and against the property served;” NRS 318.201(10) similarly instructs that “the amount of the charges (elected to be collected on the tax roll) shall constitute a lien against the lot or parcel of land against which the charge has been imposed;” NRS 318.203 instructs that “where a dwelling unit (on a)…parcel of real property upon which the unit referenced…exists that is not currently being charged for services provided…the board…of trustees…may adopt a resolution…to charge the owner (of that unit)…for the services provided;” NRS 318.170(1)(b) instructs that “all owners of inhabited property in the district (may be compelled) to use (and pay for) the district’s system for the collection and disposal of sewage, garbage and other refuse;” and, NRS 318.201(1) instructs that when a “board which has adopted rates pursuant to this chapter…elect(s) to have such charges for the forthcoming fiscal year collected on the tax roll…it shall cause a written report to be prepared…which shall contain a description of each parcel of real property receiving such services and facilities and the amount of the charge for each parcel for such year.” In all of these examples it is the owner of real property who is charged for the services and facilities a GID provides to real property.
  3. See ¶II at page 8 of Legislative Commission of the Legislative Counsel Bureau, State of Nevada (“LCB”), Bulletin No. 77-11, Creation, Financing and Governance of General Improvement Districts, September 1976 (LCB Bulletin 77-11).
  4. In Nevada counties, cities and unincorporated towns are general purpose governments because each is granted general powers to provide for the health, safety and welfare of its inhabitants. Counties are vested “with the appropriate authority to address matters of local concern” [see NRS 244.137(6)]. “The term…matters of local concern (expressly)…include(s those addressing)…public health, safety and welfare” [see NRS 244.143(2)(a)]. Cities are vested with express powers to: “provide for safeguarding public health” [see NRS 266.330(1)], “provide generally for the public safety” [see NRS 266.277(1)], and regulate and license (see NRS 266.355) which encompasses statements attesting to the welfare of the community [see NRS 425.520(2)]. Unincorporated towns are vested with express powers to: provide for “public health, safety and morals” [see NRS 269.190 et seq.], and, “protect the public health and welfare” [see NRS 269.227, 269.128, 269.171(1)]. In contrast, GIDs are not expressly permitted to exercise any of these powers.
  5. See NRS 318.116.
  6. See NRS 318.055(4)(b).
  7. See NRS 318.077.
  8. See NRS 318.055(4)(a).
  9. See A.G.O. No. 63-61, p. 102, at p. 103 (August 12, 1963).
  10. See ¶1(A) at page 35 of IVGID’s 2019 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (“the 2019 CAFR”).
  11. See https://www.yourtahoeplace.com/ivgid/about-ivgid.
  12. See ¶11 at page 10 of LCB Bulletin 77-11.
  13. Dillon’s Rule is recited at NRS 244.137(3)-(4) as well as NRS 268.001(3)-(4) and “provides that (the governing boards of local governments) possess…and may exercise only the following powers and no others: (a) those,,,granted in express terms by the Nevada Constitution or statute; (b) those…necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; and (c) those…essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the (local government) and not merely convenient but indispensable…Dillon’s Rule also provides that if there is any fair or reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a power, that doubt is resolved against the (governing) board of (the local government) and the power is denied.”
  14. See page 7 of the 5 Year CIP Summary Approved May 22, 2019 by the Board (“the 2019 5YR CIP“).
  15. See page 310 of the packet of materials prepared by staff in anticipation of the Board’s November 8, 2023 meeting (“the 11/8/2023 Board packet“).
  16. See pages 308-312 of the 11/8/2023 Board packet.
  17. See page 8 of the 5 Year CIP Summary Approved May 27, 2020 by the Board (“the 2020 5YR CIP“).
  18. See page 10 of the 2020 5YR CIP.
  19. See page 9 of the 2020 5YR CIP.
  20. During the winter months the District’s two 36-passenger shuttle buses are primarily used as a Diamond Peak ski shuttle. The District’s 14-passenger shuttle van is primarily used as a Diamond Peak ski shuttle when demand does not warrant the 36-passenger shuttle buses. One or the other of these shuttles run daily throughout a series of stops in the community transporting members of the general public to/from Diamond Peak. The trams transport members of the general public from/to off resort parking lots and Diamond Peak proper. During holidays when Diamond Peak is the busiest, overflow parking is offered at the Sierra Nevada University, Aspen Grove, and Incline Beach parking lots. The District’s shuttle buses service these parking lots transporting members of the general public to/from Diamond Peak. The shuttle buses are also used as a daily Hyatt Lake Tahoe Hotel (“Hyatt”) shuttle transporting members of the general public to/from the Hyatt/Diamond Peak. During the summer months, the District’s two shuttle buses are used as a complimentary shuttle service for members of the general public to and around Incline Village. On Wednesdays and Fridays the District transports senior members of the general public from/to Incline Village and either Carson City/Reno using the District’s remaining fleet of vehicles “for shopping, errands, outings, and medical or personal appointments. This door-to-door, reliable, affordable (money losing $5) service provides local seniors a way to get around, run errands, make appointments and take care of business…On Demand” transportation is also available for other individual needs. $35 per person includes a same-day round trip for errands, appointments, personal services, etc. (additional fees apply after 3 hours). Airport transportation services (drop-off or pick up) are $45 per person.”
  21. Besides the enormous capital cost, in June of 2015 staff announced it had outsourced this service for 17-19 represented dates at a cost of $15,000 (that’s close to $800/day) plus the costs of fuel, possible maintenance, insurance, staff to operate those buses, and central services costs (bringing the total cost to closer to $40,000.
  22. Those proceedings would include: the Board’s adoption of an ordinance [see NRS 318.055(2)] proposing the adding of a new basic power6; “the…mail(ing) of written notice to all property owners within the…district of the intention of the board of county commissioners to” add a new basic power “which notice shall set forth the…time and place of hearing” (see NRS 318.060); and, “at the place, date and hour specified for the hearing in the notice…the board of county commissioners shall give full consideration to all protests which may have been filed and shall hear all persons desiring to be heard and shall thereafter adopt an ordinance either (adding the proposed new basic power)…or determining that it shall not be” granted [see NRS 318.070(1)] with the proviso proponents must “show that the (adding of such proposed new basic power) is economically sound and feasible” [see NRS 318.070(2)].
  23. See NRS 244.137(4) and NRS 268.001(4).
  24. See https://www.rtcwashoe.com/public-transportation/.
  25. See Ronnow v. City of Las Vegas, 57 Nev. 332, 341-43, 65 P.2d 133 (1937) which instructs that “a  municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation – not simply convenient, but indispensable…Neither the corporation nor its officers can do any act, (n)or make any contract, (n)or incur any liability, not authorized thereby, (n)or by some legislative act applicable thereto. (And) all acts beyond the scope of the powers granted are void” (Id., at 57 Nev. 343).
  26. The District’s capital improvement plan (“CIP”) for Ski [see pages 612-613 and 615 of the packet of materials prepared by staff in anticipation of the Board’s May 25, 2023 meeting (“the 5/25/2023 Board packet“) as well as page 4 of the Final 5/26/2022 Five-Year Capital Improvement Summary (“the 2022-2023 5YR CIP“)] and the Rec Center (see page 626 of the 5/25/2023 Board packet as well as page 5 of the 2022-2023 5YR CIP) includes revenues for the vehicles the subject of its regional transportation system.
  27. See page 232 of the packet of materials prepared by staff in anticipation of the Board’s May 26, 2022 Board packet (“the 5/26/2022 Board packet“).
  28. See ¶I at page 234 of the 5/26/2022 Board packet.
  29. See pages 232-237 of the 5/26/2022 Board packet.
  30. NRS 318.055(4)(c)(2) instructs that County Boards must find “that…creation of the district is economically sound and feasible.”
  31. Which states “the District operates under a Board-Manager form of government which places the Board of Trustees in the role of establishing overall IVGID policy direction. IVGID Staff is appointed to administer and execute day-to-day operations. The (General) Manager is responsible for supervising these operations and providing general administrative direction.”
  32. Which states “the General Manager has the authority to execute contracts, not to exceed $100,000, so long as the funds (a)re budgeted for the specific purpose” intended.
  33. Contrary to NRS 318.175 which expressly grants these powers to GID Boards.
  34. “(1) Historically under Nevada law, the exercise of powers by a (governing) board of (a local government) has been governed by a common-law rule…known as Dillon’s Rule…(2) In Nevada’s jurisprudence, the Nevada Supreme Court has adopted and applied Dillon’s Rule [see Ronnow v. City of Las Vegas, 57 Nev. 332, 341-43, 65 P.2d 133 (1937)] to county, city and other local governments.
  35. See NRS 244.137(4) and 268.001(4).
  36. See ¶1(A) at page 35 of IVGID’s 2019 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (“the 2019 CAFR”).
  37. See page 1 of that August 21, 2015 memorandum from Ass’t District Attorney Paul Lipparelli to the County Board  insofar as “the Legal Authority of GIDs in Nevada” wherein he concludes that once created, “GIDs are independent legal entities with their own perpetual existence.”
  38. See https://www.yourtahoeplace.com/ivgid/about-ivgid.
  39. See Ronnow v. City of Las Vegas, 57 Nev. 332, 341-43, 65 P.2d 133 (1937).
  40. NRS 318.020(1) defines “acquisition” as the “acquisition…by purchase…condemnation, lease, rent, gift, grant, bequest, devise, contract or other(wise), or any combination thereof.”
  41. A legal maxim is an established principle or proposition of law (go to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_maxim).
  42. See United States v. Barnes, 222 U.S. 513, 515 (1912).
  43. Which literally means “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other.”
  44. That’s right. The District maintains but a single checking account. But for investments in income producing vehicles like certificates of deposit, day-to-day revenues and expenses are made into/out of a single checking account. Those transactions are reported in various accounting funds through a chart of accounts legend which assigns unique identification names and numbers to each transaction. Summaries can then be prepared using one or more software sorting programs.
  45. Which states that “any bailee of any money, goods or property…with whom any money, property or effects have been deposited or entrusted, who uses or appropriates the money, property or effects or any part thereof in any manner or for any other purpose than that for which they were deposited or entrusted, is guilty of embezzlement, and shall be punished in the manner prescribed by law for the stealing or larceny of property of the kind and name of the money, goods, property or effects so taken, converted, stolen, used or appropriated.”
  46. Including those who/which are not assessed the RFF.
  47. See State v. Medeiros, 89 Hawaii 361, 370, 973 P.2d 736, 745 (1999).
  48. And “th(os)e (who are assessed) themselves are, if anything, only incidental beneficiaries.”

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