In order to answer the query, we begin with the proposition Statutory Construction: the meaning of a statute begins and ends with its literal words. Thus where a statute’s language is plain and unambiguous on its face, it is inappropriate … Continue reading →
We have elsewhere discussed how the Legislature has instructed we construe the powers a GID may exercise. Here we discuss how courts have instructed the same query. Although there are a number of judicially recognized rules for interpreting statutes, here … Continue reading →
But for a judicial confirmation petition which “pray(s for)…judicial examination and determination of the validity of any power conferred or of any instrument, act or project of the municipality, whether or not such power has been exercised, such instrument has … Continue reading →
What remedies are available to a GID assuming one or more members of the public allege the former is exceeding its limited powers? The answer appears at NRS 43.100(1) which instructs that: “The governing body…(of a)…municipality…may file or cause to … Continue reading →
What remedies are available to members of the general assuming one or more allege the District is exceeding its limited powers? The answer is simple. There are none! Some years ago a member of the public brought suit against the Incline … Continue reading →
In a word, “No.” And what follows are the reasons why. As we’ve demonstrated elsewhere, “each year, the District establishes…annual Recreation…and Beach Facility Fee(s)…collected from property owners within the District through a levy placed on the(ir) property tax bill(s)…As part … Continue reading →
Because the RFF/BFF do not satisfy the minimum requisites for a legitimate “fee,” as we’ve elsewhere demonstrated, they do not qualify as “standby service charges.” Nevertheless, let’s assume arguendo the RFF/BFF can be “fees.” Here we address whether they can … Continue reading →
Because the RFF/BFF do not satisfy the minimum requisites for a legitimate “fee,” as we’ve elsewhere demonstrated, they do not qualify as “rates, tolls or charges…for services or facilities furnished by the district.” Nevertheless, let’s assume arguendo the RFF/BFF can … Continue reading →
Because the RFF/BFF do not satisfy the minimum requisites for a legitimate “fee,” as we’ve elsewhere demonstrated, they do not qualify as “service charges.” Nevertheless, let’s assume arguendo the RFF/BFF can be “fees.” Here we address whether they can be … Continue reading →
Because the RFF/BFF do not satisfy the minimum requisites for a legitimate “fee,” as we’ve elsewhere demonstrated, they do not qualify as “charges for the availability of service.” Nevertheless, let’s assume arguendo the RFF/BFF can be “fees.” Here we address … Continue reading →