As demonstrated elsewhere, general improvement districts (“GIDs”) are limited purpose special districts. Therefore their powers are to be strictly construed and limited¹ to those provided by the Legislature² as explicitly conferred by their County Boards of Commissioners (“County Boards”) in the GID’s initiating ordinance³ as supplemented, if at all, by: those “additional basic power(s expressly) granted⁴…pursuant to NRS 318.077;”⁵ “sections of this chapter (NRS 318) designated therein;”³ and, none other¹.

Introduction: As with the propriety of all local governmental powers, we begin our analysis with the Nevada Constitution given it “is the ‘supreme law of the state which ‘control[s] over any conflicting statutory provisions.”⁶ Nev. Const. Art. 8, Sec. 8 instructs that the Legislature shall provide for/restrict the powers of general purpose governments. Since the Legislature has created the GID law⁷, and the Incline Village General Improvement District (“IVGID”) is a GID⁸, its powers are recognized/restricted by NRS 318.

The basic powers the Washoe County Board has expressly granted to IVGID (all of which have been provided by the Legislature²) consist of furnishing facilities for: streets, alleys and public highways⁹; curbs and gutters¹⁰; sidewalks¹¹; storm drainage and flood control¹²; sanitary sewerage¹³; water¹⁴; lighting public streets, ways and places¹⁵; the collection and disposal of garbage and refuse¹⁶; public recreation¹⁷; and, electric light and power¹⁸. Notably, nowhere has the Washoe County Board granted to IVGID municipal police powers¹⁹ to provide for the health, safety or general welfare of any inhabitants within its geographical boundaries²⁰ even where those inhabitants, or the GID itself, may be “interested” in proposed statewide legislation/regulation. Nor has it granted to IVGID the basic power to levy taxes to pay for such services but for ad valorem taxes²¹. Nor to further tax local parcel/dwelling unit owners to pay for snowplowing and sanding someone else’s publicly dedicated streets and highways under the disingenuous justification those streets and highways are a necessary ingress/egress route to/from the District’s recreational facilities which make them available to be used by those parcels/dwelling units which are involuntarily assessed.

NRS 318.100(1) instructs that GID “board(s) shall have each of the basic powers enumerated in this chapter and designated in the organizational…and in any reorganizational proceedings of the district taken pursuant to NRS 318.077 and other provisions supplemental thereto in this chapter, or otherwise authorized by law. (Thus) except as otherwise provided in this chapter the board may construct or otherwise acquire any improvement appertaining to any such basic power which the district may exercise and may finance the costs of any such improvement by any of the procedures provided in this chapter.”

Moreover, NRS 318.055(4)(b) instructs that “the basic…powers stated in (a GID’s)…initiating ordinance (are)…supplemented by the sections of…chapter (NRS 318) designated therein.”³ NRS 318.145 and 318.175(2) are both sections of chapter NRS 318 and instruct, respectively, that GID Boards: “shall have the power to operate, maintain and repair the improvements acquired by the district, including, without limitation, the maintenance and repair of dedicated streets and alleys and the removal of snow therefrom;” and, “to acquire, improve, equip, operate and maintain any district project.” Based upon these authorities, the District has the power to maintain, repair and snowplow dedicated streets, highways and alleys. However, that’s not the question we raise here.

Rather, our question is whether the District’s Recreation (“RFF”) or Beach (“BFF”) Facility Fee(s) local property owners are compelled to pay/guaranty can legitimately be used to pay for the maintenance, repair or snowplowing of someone else’s publicly dedicated streets, highways or alleys? For the reasons stated herein, we say no!

The Particulars: Although very early on the District was granted the basic power to construct public streets, alleys and highways⁹, essentially all²² were dedicated to Washoe County which thereafter became responsible for their maintenance, repair and snowplowing during the winter months. And in particular, all of Country Club Drive and Ski Way with the exception of the portion to the northeast of First Green Drive/Fairview Blvd., were dedicated to the county²³. One may therefore appreciate how surprised we were to learn that the District: provides “all necessary equipment, work and labor” to plow the following roadways of snow and apply sand to those roadways thereafter to county standards: Country Club Drive from the intersections at State Highway (“SH”) 28 and Ski Way; Ski Way from the intersections at Country Club Drive and First Green Drive/Fairview Blvd. (close to the Big Water Grille Restaurant); and, Ski Way from the intersections at First Green and Tirol Drives at the entrance to the Tyrolean Village planned unit development (“PUD”); and, “holds the (county)…harmless from any claim whatsoever by reason…the claims of third parties who may have personal and property damage injury as a result of…its providing (these) services.”²⁴ And why? Because of the February 7, 1978 inter-local agreement.

Okay. So what consideration did the County agree to provide in exchange? The sand²⁵, and its “reasonable efforts to enforce traffic speed controls on those (privately owned) portions of” Ski Way to the northeast of its intersection with First Green Drive/Fairview Blvd. all the way to Tirol Drive at the entrance to Tyrolean Village²⁶.

The Costs the District Incurs to Satisfy its Obligations Under the February 7, 1978 Inter-Local Agreement: ¶(3) of the February 7, 1978 agreement²⁷ recites that the District “shall annually budget sufficient monies to provide the services described (t)herein during the term of (said) agreement.” Moreover, NRS 277.180(4) instructs that where as here a public agency has entered into an inter-local agreements pursuant to the provisions of NRS 277.180(1) [see discussion below], “each public agency which has entered into an agreement pursuant to this section shall annually at the time of preparing its budget include an estimate of the expenses necessary to carry out such agreement…and provide for such expense as other items are provided in its budget.” For these reasons a local resident made a public records request asking to examine the annual budgets which provide for the District’s services described in the February 7, 1978 agreement. And in response, District staff disingenuously responded it had no public records which responded to the request. So we are forced to make an educated estimate. Since the District has purchased two Caterpillar loaders at a cost of $265,0000/each; tire chains at a cost of $20,000/loader; snow plows at a cost of $19,000/loader; bloated maintenance services through our Internal Services-Fleet Department; fuel; and, skilled employee personnel costs; and the costs are not inconsequential.

And Where Does the Money Come From to Pay For These Costs? Since District staff refuse to share where in the budget these costs have been assigned, we cannot definitively share that admission. However it seems pretty clear the answer is revenues assigned to the District’s Community Services (i.e., Recreation) Fund. And since each year this fund is budgeted to lose millions of dollars; when one loses money globally it’s disingenuous to assign any portion of that loss to any “cherry picked” revenue source; and, we’ve demonstrated those losses are subsidized by the RFF; the simple answer to the question posed is the RFF!

NRS 205.300(1): In order to demonstrate that staff’s tactics insofar as these impermissible costs are concerned, one needs to understand, in part, the representations the District makes in support of its involuntary assessment of the RFF local property owners are compelled to pay/guaranty. To staff it doesn’t matter how the District receives its money. Nor does it matter to them on what the money is supposed to be spent. Since it all gets deposited into a single account²⁸, as far as staff are concerned, the money is available to be spent as they see fit. And spent it is!

But given the District represents (as elsewhere discussed) that the RFF pays for the (mere) availability to access and use the public’s recreation facilities; and, here we see that the same has been used to pay for services the District has no power to furnish; we submit that using the RFF to pay for snowplowing and sanding of Washoe County’s publicly dedicated streets and roads is a violation of NRS 205.300(1)²⁹. So where exactly do staff get off using funds collected for completely other purposes to pay for snowplowing?

The District’s Justification: We believe there is none. Although the preface to the February 7, 1978 inter-local agreement recites it has been entered into “in accordance with the provisions of NRS 277.180,” NRS 277.180(1) recites that although “any one or more public agencies may contract with any one or more other public agencies to perform any governmental service, activity or undertaking which any of the public agencies entering into the contract is authorized by law to perform,” where is the District authorized to snowplow and sand someone else’s street or road? Notwithstanding, if the reader would like to consider the Board’s/staff’s perceived justification and our response, you’re directed to our Staff’s/the Board’s Justification For Exceeding the Limited Powers the District May Permissibly Exercise discussion.

Conclusion: For the reasons stated, we believe it is a misuse of NRS 318.197(1) [the power to fix rates, tolls and charges] to use the RFF the District involuntarily assesses to fund snowplowing and sanding of county dedicated streets and roads Washoe County is under an obligation to plow and sand. What do you think?

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1. See A.G.O. No. 63-61, p. 102, at p. 103 (August 12, 1963).
2. See NRS 318.116.
3. See NRS 318.055(4)(b).
4. See NRS 318.055(4)(a).
5. NRS 318.077 allows a GID “board (to) elect to add basic powers not provided in its formation, in which event the board shall cause proceedings to be had by the board of county commissioners similar, as nearly as may be, to those provided for the formation of the district, and with like effect.”
6. See Thomas v. Nev. Yellow Cab Corp., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 52, 327 P.3d 518, 521 (2014).
7. See NRS 318.010.
8. NRS 318.015(1) instructs that “each district organized pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be a body corporate and politic…quasi-municipal corporation” and general improvement district. 
9. See sec. 3(a) of Ordinance 97, Bill 57, as authorized by NRS 318.116(7).
10. See sec. 3(b) of Ordinance 97, Bill 57, as authorized by NRS 318.116(8).
11. See sec. 3(c) of Ordinance 97, Bill 57, as authorized by NRS 318.116(9).
12. See sec. 3(d) of Ordinance 97, Bill 57, as authorized by NRS 318.116(10).
13. See sec. 3(e) of Ordinance 97, Bill 57, as authorized by NRS 318.116(11).
14. See sec. 3(g) of Ordinance 97, Bill 57, as authorized by NRS 318.116(15).
15. See sec. 3(i) of Ordinance 97, Bill 102, as authorized by NRS 318.116(16).
16. See sec. 3(j) of Ordinance 97, Bill 102, as authorized by NRS 318.116(13).
17. See sec. 21.5 of former NRS 318.143(1) [SB297, Chapter 413, page 1088, 1965 Statutes]. At the next legislative session this provision was amended to delete the word “public” [see sec 63 of former NRS 318.143(1) {SB408, Chapter 582, page 1714, 1967 Statutes]. At the same time sec. 24 of former NRS 318.116 was adopted [SB408, Chapter 582, page 1693, 1967 Statutes] which added the basic power of “furnishing recreation facilities.” Today this basic power appears at NRS 318.116(14).
18. See sec. 3(l)(1) of Ordinance 97, Bill 227, as authorized by NRS 318.116(1).
19. “Police power(s) do…not specifically refer to the right of state and local governments to create police forces…(Rather, they are) defined as the power of a governmental body to impose laws and regulations which are reasonably related to the protection or promotion of a public good…for the benefit of their communities…such as health, safety or welfare…The sovereign power of a state includes protection of safety, health, morals, prosperity, comfort, convenience and welfare of the public. In the U.S., the authority to regulate local matters concerning health, safety, and morality of state residents is reserved to states under the Tenth (10^th) Amendment to the (U.S.) Constitution…Usually states delegate to their political subdivisions the power to enact measures to preserve and protect safety, health, welfare, and morals of the community” (go to https://municipal.uslegal.com/police-powers/).
20. Do a search for municipal police powers in NRS 318. They do not exist. Now do the same thing insofar as counties [NRS 244.137(6) instructs that counties are empowered to address matters of local concern. Matters of local concern are defined at NRS 244.143(2)(a) to include public health, safety and welfare], incorporated cities [NRS 267.530 instructs that the powers set forth in “NRS 267.450 to 267.525, inclusive, (are) necessary to secure the public health, safety, convenience and welfare” of an incorporated city’s inhabitants] and unincorporated towns [NRS 269.190, et seq. address the powers unincorporated towns may exercise. Those powers are listed under the under the “public health, safety, and morals” provisions of NRS chapter 269. NRS 269.190 instructs that “boards of county commissioners may establish and maintain a board of health in any unincorporated town;” NRS 269.235(1) and 269.240(5) instruct that a “town board or board of county commissioners may appoint from the residents of an unincorporated town one chief of police and as many other peace officers as…in (their) judgment, the public safety may require;” and, NRS 269.128 instructs that the “property, public services and franchises” unincorporated towns may exercise “promote the general welfare of those inhabitants”] are concerned. As the reader can see, the exact opposite is true. The fact counties, cities and unincorporated towns have expressly been granted municipal police powers and GIDs have not, is further evidence the Legislature did not intend that GIDs provide for the health, safety and general welfare of those inhabiting their geographic boundaries. Stated differently, since Washoe County already has the power to provide for the health, safety and welfare of Incline Village/Crystal Bay inhabitants, why do the latter require IVGID to do the same thing?
21. NRS 318.225 provides that GID “Board(s) shall have power and authority to levy and collect general (ad valorem) taxes on and against all taxable property within the district.”
22. An exception being Ski Way to the northeast of its intersection with First Green Drive/Fairview Blvd. all the way to Tirol Drive at the entrance to Tyrolean Village.
23. See ¶(b) of that February 7, 1978 Inter-Local Cooperative Agreement between Washoe County and the District insofar as snow plowing and sanding responsibilities [see pages 498-501 of the packet of materials prepared by staff in anticipation of the Board’s July 13, 2021 meeting (“the 7/13/2021 Board packet”) are concerned (“the February 7, 1978 inter-local agreement).
24. See ¶(4) of the February 7, 1978 inter-local agreement at page 499 of the 7/13/2021 Board packet .
25. See ¶(2) at page 499 of the 7/13/2021 Board packet.
26. In other words, nothing inasmuch as it is not unlawful to speed on a privately owned road [see ¶(6) at page 500 of the the 7/13/2021 Board packet].
27. See page 499 of the 7/13/2021 Board packet.
28. That’s right. The District maintains but a single checking account. But for investments in income producing vehicles like certificates of deposit, day-to-day revenues and expenses are made into/out of a single checking account. Those transactions are reported in various accounting funds through a chart of accounts legend which assigns unique identification names and numbers to each transaction. Summaries can then be prepared using one or more software sorting programs.
29. Which states that “any bailee of any money, goods or property…with whom any money, property or effects have been deposited or entrusted, who uses or appropriates the money, property or effects or any part thereof in any manner or for any other purpose than that for which they were deposited or entrusted, is guilty of embezzlement, and shall be punished in the manner prescribed by law for the stealing or larceny of property of the kind and name of the money, goods, property or effects so taken, converted, stolen, used or appropriated.”