In order to answer the query, we begin with the proposition

Statutory Construction: the meaning of a statute begins and ends with its literal words¹. Thus where a statute’s language is plain and unambiguous on its face, it is inappropriate to resort to any ancillary construction aids². Such rules limit courts from ignoring parts of a statute in order to reach a more reasonable construction. And prohibit courts from “insert(ing) words…the Court believes the legislature left out, be it intentionally or inadvertently.”³

Dillon’s Rule: If the task were merely construing what a statute literally states, or fails to state, that would be one thing. But sometimes there are other statutes which instruct how to interpret what a statute literally states. That’s the case here, and it’s called Dillon’s Rule⁴. Historically, at least under Nevada law, the exercise of powers by the governing bodies of a county, incorporated city and other local governments (like GIDs) have been governed by the common-law rule on local governmental power known as Dillon’s Rule⁵. Dillon’s Rule basically “provides that (a)…governing body…possesses and may exercise only the following powers and no others:

1. Those…granted in express terms by the Nevada Constitution, statute or…charter;

2. Those…necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted⁶; and,

3. Those…(absolutely) essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the (local governing body at issue) and not merely convenient but indispensable.”⁷

4. And “if there (be) any fair or reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a power, that doubt is (to be) resolved against the governing body…and the power (be) denied.”⁸

To cement the case Dillon’s Rule is the mainstay in Nevada, one need only recognize that it has been formally embodied into the NRS⁹. Moreover, insofar as “any local governing body other than a board of county commissioners” and a city council are concerned (i.e., a GID Board), nothing shall be interpreted to modify Dillon’s Rule¹⁰. Thus “Dillon’s Rule serves an important function in defining the powers of (local) government(s) and remains a vital component of Nevada law.”¹¹

Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius (that’s Latin by-the-way): If the arguments above weren’t sufficient to convince the reader of the rules of statutory interpretation, Nevada law recognizes yet another. The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius¹². This maxim holds that “where a…statute specifies certain things, th(at) designation…excludes all others.”¹³ In other words, GIDs do not possess the power to fix rates, tolls or charges for the mere availability of facilities because expressio unius est exclusio alterius “is a term of limitation and not enlargement…And where…applied, it prescribes all of the things or classes of things to which the statute pertains. All other possible objects of the statute are, thereby excluded, by implication.”¹⁴ And as a consequence,

“Court(s) may not, through judicial fiat, second-guess the legislature and decide, sua sponte, that public policy would be better served by inferring the power to fix a type of charge not expressly stated…(Because) considerations of public policy must be declared by the legislature and not the Court(s).”¹⁵

Conclusion: So there you go! Because in Nevada Dillon’s Rule is declared in the NRS⁷, “the preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires us to presume…(that the) Legislature says…what it means and means…what it says(. Thus where as here)…the text is unambiguous…our inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well.“¹⁶ Given we must presume that the provisions of NRS 318 are clear and unambiguous, they are to be “enforce(d)…as written”¹⁷. Thus whenever there is a question as to whether IVGID may acquire or furnish a particular facility or service, or exercise a power pertaining thereto, Nevada offers no “wiggle room” because it has adopted Dillon’s Rule! And if there be “any fair or reasonable doubt…(it) is (to be) resolved against (IVGID)…and the power (be) denied.”⁸

And now you know!

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1. See Arguello v. Sunset Station, Inc., 127 Nev. 365, 370, 252 P.3d 206, 209 (2011).
2. See State Farm Mut. v. Comm’r of Ins, 114 Nev. 535, 540, 958 P.2d 733 (1998); Erwin v. State of Nevada, 111 Nev. 1535, 1538, 908 P.2d 1367, 1369 (1995) [quoting Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Boulder City, 106 Nev. 497, 503, 797 P.2d 946, 949 (1990)]; Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 1298, 1302, 148 P.3d 790, 792-793 (2006).
3. See Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Gooding Cty., 159 Idaho 84, 356 P.3d 377, 382 (2015).
4. The Nevada League of Cities identifies thirty-one (31) “Dillon’s Rule states…and (nine that)…have (adopted) Dillon’s Rule only for certain types of municipalities” [see page 5 of A Discussion of Home Rule in Nevada, Committee to Study Powers Delegated to Local Governments (February 18, 2010)]
5. Dillon’s Rule “(wa)s named after former Chief Justice John F. Dillon of the Iowa Supreme Court who in a case from 1868, and in later treatises on the law governing local governments, set forth the common-law rule defining and limiting the powers of local governments” [see NRS 244.137(1) and 268.001(1)].
6. NRS 318.210 is the statutory embodiment of this portion of Dillon’s Rule: a GID Board of Trustees (“Board”) shall have and exercise all rights and powers necessary or incidental to or implied from the specific powers granted in this chapter.”
7. See NRS 244.137(3) and 268.001(3).
8. See NRS 244.137(4) and 268.001(4).
9. See NRS 244.137(2) and 268.001(2) which both instruct that “in Nevada’s jurisprudence, the Nevada Supreme Court has adopted and applied Dillon’s Rule to county, city [see Tucker v. Mayor and Bd. of Alderman, 4 Nev. 20, 26 (1868); State ex rel. Rosenstock v. Swift, 11 Nev. 128 (1876); NRS 244.137(2); and, NRS 268.001(2)] and other local governments” [although the Rule has been expressly applied to county, city and other types of local government(s) {see Waltz v. Ormsby County, 1 Nev. 370, 376-377 (1865)} across the State, we don’t have a reported case which declares the Rule is expressly applicable to GIDs. “The absence of cases involving special districts…most probably…stems from the fact (they)…are created to carry out relatively narrow, statutorily specified (i.e., limited) purposes with the method of financing those activities also prescribed by the underlying statute(s). This is far different from the situation Nevada cities and counties face: an increasing myriad of functions imposed by the state or federal governments, with a taxing regime almost fully centralized and controlled by the state government” [go to https://www.nvbar.org/wp-content/uploads/NevLawyer_June_2013_Dillon’s_Rule.pdf. Also, see NRS 244.137(3)]. But because GIDs are public agencies endowed with only such attributes of a municipality as may be deemed necessary [GIDs are not true municipalities. Rather, they are “quasi-municipal” corporations. Hence their characterization as “quasi-municipal”) for the performance of their limited objectives {see City of Aurora v. Aurora Sanitation Dist., 112 Colo. 406, 411, 149 P.2d 662, 664 (1944); Goodwin v. Thieman, 74 P.3d 526, 528 (Colo. App. 2003)}, those statutes which provide authority to GIDs must be “strictly construed and limited “to those expressly provided by the Legislature and no others” [see A.G.O. No. 63-61, p. 102, at p. 103 (August 12, 1963)].
10. See NRS 244.137(7)(a) and NRS 268.001(7)(a)].
11. See NRS 244.137(5) and 268.001(5).
12. See Nunez v. Sahara Nevada Corp., 677 F. Supp. 1471, 1477 (D. Nev. 1988).
13. See Local 1494 of the Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 639, 586 P.2d 685, 688 (1999).
14. See ¶11 at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-9575/102239/20190611092122150_00000055.pdf.
15. See Nunez, Id; Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Gooding Cty., 159 Idaho 84, 356 P.3d 377, 382 (2015).
16. See McDonald v. Sun Oil. Co., 548 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2008).
17. See In re George J, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 32, 279 P.3d 187, 190 (2012).