In a word, no.

Similar to our discussion regarding the District’s Recreation Facility Fees (“RFFs”), there are many reasons why not. Consider the following:

What The District Tells Us The BFF Represents: As we’ve elsewhere discussed,

“Each year as part of the annual budget process the Board traditionally approves a Resolution which outlines the billing and collection process(es) set forth in Nevada Revised Statutes (“NRS”) 318.197(1)¹ and 318.201², as well as establish(es) the amount of the…BFF to be collected.”³

¶4(b) of the Resolution the Board adopts⁴ recites that the

BFF represents “standby and service charges for…the availability of the use of IVGID’s beaches (and) boat launch ramp, and that “such benefits are provided to…each parcel assessed pursuant to th(at) Resolution and in its report for the collection on the Washoe County tax roll” (see discussion below).

¶I of the Report the Board adopts⁵ recites that the

“The following annual…recreation standby and service charges, herein called (‘charges’)…are for the availability of use (in part) of the recreational facilities above described…(i.e.,) Burnt Cedar and Incline Beach(es).”

Just Because IVGID Staff And Past Boards Have Told Us The BFF Represents “Standby And Service Charges…For The Availability of The Use of IVGID’s Beaches,” Doesn‘t Necessarily Make it So: That’s because as we’ve elsewhere stated, “the nature of a monetary exaction must be determined by its operation rather than its specially descriptive phrase.”⁶ So

What Other Courts Tell Us Are “Standby Service Charges:” As we’ve elsewhere demonstrated, standby service charges represent

1. Some sort of monetary levy against⁷ and of direct benefit⁷ to real property;

2. Imposed for the mere availability to access and receive some public health and sanitation⁸ service⁹;

3. Delivered¹⁰, or capable¹¹ of delivery¹², to the real property assessed¹³;

4. Whether or not that service is actually being used⁹; and,

5. Where the real property assessed is not currently a water and/or sewer service customer. Because once property becomes an actual customer of those services, by definition, they are no longer “‘standing by’ (n)or ‘immediately available’ to be connected to the property to be benefited…(Instead,) the benefit…is in fact (actually being) provid(ed).”¹⁴

What NRS 318.197(1) Tells Us: In 1971 the rates, tolls and charges a GID could fix were modified slightly to include, what they include today¹⁵. That is, the power to fix “standby service charges, for…the availability of service” In other words, and for purposes of this discussion in particular, GID Boards are authorized to “fix, and from time to time increase or decrease…charges for…the availability of service(s)” rather than as here facilities.

The fact the words “availability of facilities” were omitted from the 1967 modifications to NRS 318.197(1) means that the “availability of facilities“ was expressly intended to be excluded from the fees a GID Board could fix¹⁶.

In Fact, There is No Such Thing as a Standby Service Charge Which Pays For The Availability of Facilities: Given the history of NRS 318.197(1), unsurprisingly, we’ve been unable to discover a single reported case, anywhere, which affirms the assessment of standby charges for the availability of use of public facilities (like the jails, courts, libraries, parks, police department, district attorney’s office, city hall, etc.) equally accessible to any other member of the general public¹⁷.

At Best, Standby Service Charges Pay For The Availability of Services: We’ve only been able to discover assessment of standby service charges in those jurisdictions which have defined the term¹⁸ to limited situations involving special benefit services affecting public health or sanitation¹⁹.

Moreover, Public Rather Than Private Services: Here the District’s beaches are private. As we’ve elsewhere demonstrated, as opposed to the public, access and use is restricted to those parcels which were included in the District’s June 4, 1968 boundaries. But insofar as government is concerned, standby service charges pay for the availability of public rather than private services.

And Recreation Rather Than Health And Sanitation Services: As aforesaid, the services furnished in consideration of a standby service charge are limited to public health and sanitation services.

Adjacent to or Capable of Physical Connection to The Alleged Service Furnished: Only a very small number of local Incline Village parcels are adjacent to or capable of connection, let alone physical connection, to any of the District’s beaches. Yet according to Policy No. 16.1.1.2.2, the BFF extends to “all identified real property that was within the District on June 1, 1968, and is in one of the categories listed in Section 1.0 of th(at) document.”

But Not The BFF: Because NRS 318.015(2) instructs “the provisions of this chapter are not intended to provide a method for financing the costs of developing private property.” Which means that where as here²⁰ the BFF is and will be used for these prohibited purposes, its validity cannot be a charge “provided by law.”²¹

Assuming Arguendo The BFF Provides Any Benefits Whatsoever, it Arguably Benefits People Rather Than Property: Because real property has no ability to access any facilities

Where The Person is Forced to Become an Actual Customer as a Precursor to Benefitting From The Alleged Service Furnished: By reason of the beach deed, those whose properties are entitled to access and use are entitled to that use by way of the use easement created therein (see discussion below), rather than payment of the BFF.

Moreover, The District Has No Authority to Elect to Collect The BFF on The County Tax Roll: Because as elsewhere discussed, although NRS 318.201(1) instructs that

“Any board which has adopted rates pursuant to this chapter may, by resolution…elect to have such charges for the forthcoming fiscal year collected on the tax roll in the same manner, by the same persons, and at the same time as, together with and not separately from, the county’s general taxes,”

This power is limited to “each parcel of real property receiving…the services.”²² Since here each parcel of property which is assessed allegedly receives the availability of the use of facilities rather than services, we submit the BFF cannot be collected on the county tax roll.

The BFF Are Not “Service Charges:” Because they provide no services in consideration of payment; especially to the real properties forced to make payment. As elsewhere stated, here service charges are fees for “intangible, value-added activities that a (business²³) provides to its customers. They…can be physical or digital. Physical services are those…you can touch, feel, or see, such as a haircut or a massage. Digital services are those that exist in the digital world, such as an app or a website…Service industries are those…that provide services to customers. These industries include…a) banking and financial services; b) professional services; healthcare; restaurants and food services; retail; transportation;”²⁴ and as here, government. So “what recreation services does the District furnish?” We can think of “things” like recreation programming; golf, tennis, ski/snowboard lessons; etc. Which means service charges are “user fees…imposed by…government for the primary purpose of (re)covering the cost(s) of providing the service(s)” which are paid by “the people (rather than properties) who benefit from the particular public…service…provided.”²⁵

Moreover, lest we not forget that the BFF is involuntarily assessed. Legitimate service charges, like other fees for services, cannot be involuntarily assessed because they require the element of consent²⁶.

The Many Admissions by Past Finance Directors, Auditors, Consultants And Others That Our BFF is Not What The District Has Represented: For a more comprehensive discussion of this topic, the reader is directed to this discussion.

It is The Beach Deed Rather Than The BFF Which Grants Local Parcel Owners The Ability of The Use of IVGID‘s Beaches: Take a look at the last two (2) paragraphs of the deed by which IVGID acquired the beaches:

“Grantor, for the benefit of…all other owners of property located within said boundaries, and their respective successor assigns in such ownership, hereby specifically reserves an easement to enter upon the above described real property (i.e., the beaches) and to use said real property for the recreational uses and purposes specified herein…The easement hereby created and reserved shall be appurtenant to all properties located within the Incline Village General Improvement District, as said District is now constituted (and) such easement…shall pass with any conveyance of real properties within said District as now constituted.”

Thus that use is explicit, and it’s not pre-conditioned upon payment of anything! Including payment of the BFF.

Conclusion: If the BFF is not a legitimate standby service charge, and the District is incapable of furnishing recreation facilities to those local real properties which are assessed, how then can it legitimately assess fees for the alleged “availability” to access and use facilities such as the beaches? And how can it use the collection procedures of NRS 318.201(9) to compel payment? The simple fact of the matter is that the BFF is not the “Recreation Standby And Service Charge…For The Availability of The Use of IVGID’s” beach facilities staff/its current/past Board(s) represent/have represented.

And now you know.

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1. Which allows general improvement district (“GID”) Boards to “fix (in part)…recreational facilit(y)…standby service charges, for services or facilities furnished by the district, (as well as)…the (mere) availability of service.”
2. Which allows “any (GID) board which has adopted rates pursuant to…chapter (NRS 318 to)…elect to have such charges for the forthcoming fiscal year collected on the tax roll.”
3. See page 103 of the packet of materials prepared by staff in anticipation of the Board’s May 27, 2020 meeting (“the 5/27/2020 Board packet”).
4. An example of such resolution would be Resolution No. 1917 adopted at the Board’s May 30, 2025 meeting.
5. An example of such Report would be the one adopted at the Board’s May 30, 2025 meeting.
6. See Emerson College v. City of Boston, 39 Mass. 415, 424, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (1984).
7. See Solvang Mun. Improvement Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 112 Cal.App.3d 545, 552, 169 Cal.Rptr. 391 (1980).
8. See McMillan v. Texas National Resources Conservation Comm’n, 983 S.W.2d 359, 365 (1998).
9. Primarily water and/or sewer services [see State of Hawaii v. Medeiros, 89 Haw. 361, 367, 973 P.2d 736, 742 (1999); Chapman v. City of Albuquerque, 65 N.M. 228, 335 P.2d 558, 562 (1959); Graham v. City of Lakewood Village, 796 S.W.2d 800, 801 (1990); Lakeside Utilities Corp. v. Bernum, 5 Ohio.St.3d 99, 449 N.E.2d 430, 431 (1983)].
10. See State v. City of Port Orange, 650 So.2d 1, 3 (1994); Chapman, supra, at 335 P. 561.
11. In other words, standby service charges require services to actually be “standing by” or “immediately available” to be delivered to real property [see Kennedy v. City of Ukiah, 69 Cal.App.3d 545, 553, 138 Cal.Rptr. 207 (1977)].
12. See Chapman, supra, at 335 P. 564.
13. As opposed to “the benefit of the general public, and not for the comfort and use of individual customers (who)…have no control over the provision or use of” public recreation” [see Okeson v. City of Seattle, 150 Wn.2d 540, 78 P.3d 1279, 1285 (2003)].
14. See San Diego Cty. Water Auth. v. Metro. Water Dist., 117 Cal.App.4th 13, 27, 11 Cal.Rptr. 446, 457 (2004).
15. See former NRS 318.200(1) and 1971 Statutes of Nevada, commencing at page 188, Sec 1.
16. See the latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius which means that “where a…statute specifies certain things, the designation of such things excludes all others” [see Local 1494 of Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 639, 586 P.2d 1346, 1355 (1978)]. Thus, where “a statute…mentions certain things specifically, the list is exclusive.” For a more comprehensive examination of this topic, the reader is invited to read our How Courts Have Instructed We Construe The Powers a GID May Exercise discussion.
17. For a more comprehensive discussion of this topic, see our What Are Standby Service Charges For Facilities web page.
18. See City of Port Orange, supra, at 650 So.2d 3; Chapman, supra, at 335 P.2d 561) in NRS 318.197(1).
19. For a more comprehensive discussion of this topic, see our Elimination of Choice Factor in Determining Whether a Monetary Exaction is a Fee web page.
20. As it was for the Burnt Cedar Pool replacement and the Incline Beach restroom projects, and according to staff it will be used for the Beach House, boat launch ramp, and who knows how many other projects to come.
21. Responding to the beach deed‘s (see discussion below) “authority to levy assessments and charges provided by law.”
22. See NRS 318.201(9).
23. The District’s recreation venues are operated as commercial “for profit” business enterprises.
24. Go to https://oboloo.com/blog/what-are-services-definition/.
25. Go to https://taxfoundation.org/taxedu/glossary/user-fee/).
26. See our What Exactly is a Fee web page for a more comprehensive discussion of this topic.