Given we’ve shared that:

1. A general improvement district’s (“GID’s”) Board of Trustees’ (“Board’s”) power to “fix, and from time to time increase or decrease…rates, tolls or charges other than special assessments” flows from NRS 318.197(1);

2. NRS 318.197(1) instructs those exactions “may…includ(e)…standby service charges, for…the availability of service(s)…furnished by the District;”

3. And for this reason and others, District staff and past/current Boards have disingenuously labeled Recreation (“RFF”) and Beach (“BFF”) Facility Fees “recreation standby and service charges;”¹

Similar to our What Are Service Charges For Services and What Are Service Charges For Facilities discussions, here we examine what are:

1. “Standby service charges…for the availability of service(s);”

2. Whether they are assessed by the District; and if so,

3. Are they the Recreation (“RFF”) and Beach (“BFF”) Facility Fees staff and past/current Boards have represented/represent¹?

Recall that just because the District represents the RFF/BFF are “standby service charges,”¹ doesn’t necessarily make them so. That’s because

“Courts will determine and classify (monetary exactions) on the basis of realities”² looking to their “operating incidence”³ rather than (their) specially descriptive phrase(s).”⁴

So with that said, let’s examine NRS 318 searching for the definition of “standby service charges…for…facilities.” Nowhere is the term defined. What about anywhere else in the NRS? Same answer. Nowhere. What about judicial decisions? Turns out not too many jurisdictions have addressed the question of what is a “standby service charge?” And none in Nevada. However, our neighbor to the west, California, has. And it first grappled with this question in 1977⁵. And then again in 2000⁶. These two appellate decisions instructed⁷ that:

“The term ‘standby charge’ is not defined in (the California Constitution⁸). Nor do the parties point out any statutory or other definition of that term. It does not appear in Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999,) (n)or in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986).”

Thus both reasoned the term “standby service charge” is one of art which is accumulated in the legal tradition and meaning of decades if not centuries of practice. Therefore,

“[W]here Congress borrows terms of art which are accumulated in the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that (a)re attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken, and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such a case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, (and) not as departure from them.”⁹

Meaning that here we should turn to those courts which have addressed this “technical term or term of art”¹⁰ (i.e., “standby service charges”). And that said:

“A New Mexico case has defined ‘standby’ as a charge or assessment levied against property adjacent to a water main but not connected to it. The utility remains ‘standby,’ ready to serve the property, and hence the property is benefited¹¹. Pennsylvania uses the term ‘ready to serve,’ and interprets it as follows: ‘In effect, it is a minimum payment demanded of patrons who desire to be placed in position to take advantage of…(water) service at their convenience, whether actually using the water or not’¹². The only distinction between the terms ‘standby’ and ‘immediately available’ appears to be the degree of availability of the water facilities as it affects the basis for determining the schedule of charges that can be imposed…Standby and availability charges are fees exacted for the benefit which accrues to property by virtue of having water available to it, even though the water might not actually be used at the present time.”¹³ Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association asserts that “standby charges are generally understood to be some sort of property levy, often based on acreage, imposed on the mere availability of a service, whether the service is used or not.”¹⁴

From all of the above, we submit the term “standby service charge” means:

1. Some sort of monetary levy against¹⁵ the real “property to be (directly) benefited”¹³ [as opposed to “the general public, and not for the comfort and use of individual customers (who)…have no control over the provision or use of” public recreation”¹⁶];

2. Imposed for the mere availability to access and receive¹³ some type of public health and sanitation¹⁷ service¹⁸ (rather than facility);

3. Delivered¹⁹ by means of some physical connection¹³ or other similar means capable of connection²⁰, to the real property directly benefited¹³;

4. “Even though (that service) might not actually be used at the present time;”¹³ and,

5. Where the real property assessed is not currently a customer because once property becomes an actual customer of the services furnished, by definition, it is no longer “‘standing by’ (n)or (is the service) ‘immediately available’ to be connected to the property to be benefited.”²¹ Instead, “the benefit…is in fact (actually being) provid(ed).”¹³

Therefore unlike service or facility fees per se, “standby service charges” don’t pay for actual access to nor use of services or facilities²². At best, they pay for the mere availability to access services¹³. And moreover, only public health and sanitation services²³ (like water and sewer²⁴)!

So now that you know what “standby service charges, for…the availability of services” are, does IVGID have the power to assess such charges? The answer’s yes. Does IVGID actually assess these charges? Although at first blush you might answer “yes,” in-truth-and-in fact the answer’s “NO!” That’s because past/current Boards have expressly told/tell us the RFF/BFF represent “standby service charges for…the availability of” facilities:

“Each year, the District establishes…annual Recreation…and Beach Facility Fee(s)…The Board traditionally approves a Resolution which at ¶4(b)¹ describes these fees as “standby and service charges…(for) the availability of the use of IVGID’s beaches; boat launch ramp; Championship golf course; Mountain golf course; tennis facilities; the Chateau and Aspen Grove; Diamond Peak Ski Resort, and Recreation Center.”²⁵ And at ¶6 of that Resolution, a Report²⁶ is incorporated therein which at ¶I describes these fees as “annual charges…for the availability of use of the recreational facilities above described.”²⁵

And now you know!

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1. Take a look at the Report the Board typically approves at the same time it adopts a Resolution each year which fixes the RFF/BFF and orders their collection on the county tax roll. The title refers to these charges as “Recreation Standby And Service Charges” [an example of the Report adopted for FY 2025-26 appears at pages 112-117 of the packet of materials prepared by staff in anticipation of the Board’s May 30, 2025 meeting (“the 5/30/2025 Board packet“)]. Additionally, ¶4(b) of the Resolution itself [an example of the resolution adopted for FY 2025-26 (No. 1917) appears at pages 108-111 of the 5/30/2025 Board packet] refers to the RFF/BFF as “standby and service charges for…the availability of the use of IVGID’s” beaches and public recreation facilities. Finally, take a look at ¶37 of Ordinance No. 7. There the term “Recreation Standby and Service Charge” is defined as “the…Recreation Fee…assessed by the District (i.e., the RFF/BFF) to support recreation services, programs and facilities.”
2. See Hukle v. City of Huntington, 134 W.Va. 249, 58 S.E.2d 780, 783 (1950); See Clean Water Coalition v. The M Resort, LLC, 127 Nev. 301, 255 P. 3d 247, 256 (2011) citing State v. Medeiros, 89 Haw. 361, 973 P.2d 736, 741 (1999).
3. See Emerson College v, City of Boston, 391 Mass. 415, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (1984),
4. See Stewarts’ Pharmacies v. Fase, 43 Haw. 131, 144 (1959) reh’g denied at 43 Haw. 166.
5. See Kennedy v. City of Ukiah, 69 Cal. App. 3d 545, 138 Cal.Rptr. 207 (1977).
6. See Keller v. Chowchilla Water Dist., 80 Cal. App. 4th 1006, 96 Cal.Rptr. 246 (2000).
7. We must defer to courts from other jurisdictions because the term “may have an accepted meaning in the area of law addressed by the statute…(Or) it may have been borrowed from another statute under which it had an accepted meaning given that in appropriate circumstances, courts will assume that “adoption of the wording of a statute from another legislative jurisdiction carries with it the previous judicial interpretations of the wording [see Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 26 (1944)]…Or it may have had an accepted and specialized meaning at common law [see, Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1989)]. In each of these possible situations, the accepted meaning governs and the word or phrase is considered a technical term or ‘term of art'” [see pages 7-8 of the Congressional Research Service, Larry M. Eig, Specialist in American Public Law, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends (December 19, 2011)].
8. Nor is it defined in the Nevada Constitution.
9. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263, 72 S.Ct. 240 (1952).
10. See Kennedy and Keller, supras, for example.
11. See Chapman v. City of Albuquerque, 65 N.M. 228, 335 P.2d 558, 561 (1959).
12. See Central Iron & Steel Co. v. Harrisburg, 271 Pa. 340, 114 A.258, 260 (1921).
13. See Kennedy, supra, at 69 Cal. App. 3d 553; San Diego Cty. Water Auth. v. Metro. Water Dist., 117 Cal.App.4th 13, 27, 11 Cal.Rptr. 446, 457 (2004).
14. See Keller, supra, at 80 Cal. App. 4th 1011.
15. See Solvang Mun. Improvement Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 112 Cal.App.3d 545, 552, 169 Cal.Rptr. 391 (1980).
16. See Okeson v. City of Seattle, 150 Wn.2d 540, 78 P.3d 1279, 1285 (2003)].
17. See McMillan v. Texas National Resources Conservation Comm’n, 983 S.W.2d 359, 365 (1998).
18. Primarily water and/or sewer [see Medeiros, supra, at 89 Haw. 367, 973 P.2d 742; Chapman, supra, at 335 P.2d 562; Graham v. City of Lakewood Village, 796 S.W.2d 800, 801 (1990); Lakeside Utilities Corp. v. Bernum, 5 Ohio.St.3d 99, 449 N.E.2d 430, 431 (1983)].
19. See State v. City of Port Orange, 650 So.2d 1, 3 (1994); Chapman, supra, at 335 P. 561.
20. In other words, standby service charges require services to actually be “standing by” or “immediately available” to be delivered (see Chapman, supra, at 335 P. 564).
21. See San Diego Cty. Water Auth., supra, at 117 Cal.App.4th 27.
22. Because the services or facilities the subject thereof are not “standing by” or “immediately available” to be connected to the property to be benefited; (they are) in fact providing the benefit.”¹³
23. See Bloom v. City of Fort Collins, 784 P.2d 304, 310 (Colo.1989); Loup-Miller Construction Co. v. City & County of Denver, 676 P.2d 1170 (1984).
24. In other words, expressly not public recreation services.
25. In other words, recreation facilities and not services!
26. For fiscal year 2025-26 that Report was labeled a “Report For Collection on the County Tax Roll of Recreation Standby and Service Charges.”