Given NRS 318.197(1) gives GID Boards the power to fix “rates, tolls and charges,”¹ here we investigate the limits on a GID Board’s power. And as with the propriety of all sorts of governmental powers, we begin our inquiry by examining the powers special districts like the Incline Village General Improvement District² (“IVGID”) are authorized to exercise.

Emerson College v. City of Boston³: instructs that the “fees imposed by a governmental entity tend to fall into one of two principal categories:

User fees, based on the rights of the entity as proprietor of the instrumentalities used…or regulatory fees (including licensing and inspection fees) founded on the (municipal) police power⁴.”

So the questions:

1. May IVGID assess and collect “regulatory fees (including licensing and inspection fees) founded on the (municipal) police power?”

2. And may IVGID assess and collect “user fees, based on the rights of the entity as proprietor of the instrumentalities used?”

The Only Fees IVGID May Assess And Collect Are “User Fees: based on the rights of the entity as proprietor of the instrumentalities used.” IVGID cannot assess and collect “regulatory fees (including licensing and inspection fees) founded on the (municipal) police power” because GIDs are limited purpose special districts⁵, unlike true municipalities such as counties⁶, cities⁷ and unincorporated towns⁸. Only true municipalities are expressly empowered to furnish general municipal police powers⁹ which provide for the “public health, safety…welfare” and morality¹⁰ of their inhabitants. And only these municipalities are empowered to regulate, tax or license businesses¹¹.

Expressly because GIDs possess no municipal police powers¹², when we speak of a GID Board’s power to fix “rates, tolls and charges,”¹³ they’re left with no power to adopt “rates, tolls (or) charges” other than “user fees based on the rights of the entity as proprietor of the instrumentalities used” exclusively. In other words,

“Fees…charged in exchange for a particular governmental service which benefits the party paying the fee in a manner ‘not shared by other members of society.’¹⁴…Collected not to raise revenues but to compensate the governmental entity providing the services for its expenses.”³

Dillon’s Rule¹⁵: As elsewhere discussed, Nevada is a “Dillon’s Rule“ State¹⁶. As such, the powers all local governments may exercise “are…limited and only extend to those…which are:

1) Granted in express words;

2) Necessarily implied or…incident to…powers expressly granted; and,

3) Absolutely essential to the declared objects and purposes of the (municipal) corporation – not simply convenient, but indispensable.”¹⁷

The Rule also states that should there be “any reasonable doubt…as to whether a power has been granted(, it) will be ruled against the local government” and denied¹⁸.

In other words, since “municipalities run by municipal codes (state laws and) can only act where specifically authorized by state law,”¹⁹ they can only “fix, and from time to time increase or decrease…fees”¹³ where expressly authorized by state law. And in Nevada, that law is NRS 318.197(1).

NRS 318.197(1): So here we have several powers granted by express words. Although GID Boards “may fix, and from time to time increase or decrease (a variety of)…rates, tolls or charges,” there are at least four (4) limitations on this power. First, this power expressly does not extend to “special assessments.” Second, the exercise of this power must be expressly “for services or facilities furnished by the district.” Third, this power is limited by NRS 354.613(2) when it comes to increased fees imposed for the purposes for which an enterprise fund²⁰ was created²¹. And finally, for the reasons stated above this power may not be used to charge “regulatory fees (including licensing and inspection fees).” Or as a means of generating revenue.

NRS 318.015(2): So here we have another power granted by express words. One which instructs

“That the provisions of this chapter²² are not intended to provide a method for financing the costs of developing private property.”

Given essentially everyone in town (especially realtors – just look at their web sites²³) including such stalwarts as the Lake Tahoe Hyatt Hotel²⁴ and Trustee Mick Homan²⁵ readily admit IVGID’s beaches are “private,” the District’s power to fix rates, tolls and charges¹³ is limited, at least by NRS 318.015(2), when it comes to the beaches.

Hierarchy of Power: This discussion shouldn’t be a foreign concept to the reader. After all, does not the federal government have powers State governments do not? What about State powers versus local government powers? Isn’t there an hierarchy of power? So why would anyone think States have powers equivalent to or in excess of those of the federal government? Or that municipalities would have powers equivalent to or in excess of those of the State? Or that limited purpose special districts like IVGID² would have powers equivalent to or in excess of those of municipalities or the State?

State of Hawaii v. Medeiros²⁶: instructs that in order “to distinguish between a ‘fee’ and a ‘tax’…

We analyze whether the charge:

(1) Applies to the direct beneficiary of a particular service;

(2) Is allocated directly to defraying the costs of providing the service; and,

(3) Is reasonably proportionate to the benefit received…If those criteria fit the charge, it is a fee.”²⁷

(4) And there is a fourth (4) pillar to the above “modified Emerson College test;”²⁸ the element of “choice.”²⁹

And now you know!

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1. The term “rates, tolls and charges” represents different names for “specific services” for which “fixed price(s are) charged (see https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fee.asp). According to an AI search, a “rate is a fixed fee or cost per unit of service (often used for utilities like water or electricity). A toll is a fee paid for the use of a specific road, bridge, or tunnel, typically collected at designated points. A charge is a fee imposed for a service or product, which can vary based on usage or specific conditions.” The common denominator here being that all are fees!
2. NRS 308.020(2) instructs that IVGID is a special district given it is a GID “organized under the local improvement and service district laws of this State.”
3. See 391 Mass. 415, 424-425, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (1984),
4. Those incredibly broad regulatory powers related generally to “[p]ublic safety…health, morality, peace and quiet, (and) law and order” [see Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32, 75 S.Ct. 98 (1954)]. These powers flow from the Tenth Amendment  to the U.S. Constitution which states that “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”
5. See ourWhat Are GIDs discussion.
6. See NRS 244.143(2)(a).
7. See NRS 268.003(2)(a).
8. See NRS 269.128, and 269.185, et seq.
9. A requirement under NRS 244.137(2) and 268.001(2).
10. See NRS 244.150, et seq., 268.409, et sq and 269.190, et seq.
11. See NRS 244.335, et seq., 268.0035(1) and 269.170, et seq. as long as those businesses are not “subject to substantial regulation by a federal or state agency” [see NRS 268.0035(4)(b)].
12. Art. VIII, §8 of the Nevada Constitution instructs that “the Legislature shall provide for the organization of cities and towns by general laws, and shall restrict their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts and loaning their credit, except for procuring supplies of water.”
13. See NRS 318.197(1).
14. See National Cable Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341, 94 S.Ct. 1146 (1974).
15. Judge John Forrest Dillon served on the Iowa Supreme Court from 1863 to 1869, before being appointed to the Federal Eighth Judicial Circuit. He was also a noted legal scholar, publishing extensively on municipal law. In two opinions for the Iowa Supreme Court he laid out a rule of law which was subsequently adopted by other state supreme courts and eventually…the U.S. Supreme Court” (go to https://www.nvbar.org/wp-content/uploads/NevLawyer_June_2013_Dillon’s_Rule.pdf). Also see NRS 244.137(1) and 268.001(1).
16. See page 5 of A Discussion of Home Rule in Nevada, Committee to Study Powers Delegated to Local Governments (February 18, 2010); NRS 244.137(2) and 268.001(2).
17. This is Dillon’s Rule. See https://www.nvbar.org/wp-content/uploads/NevLawyer_June_2013_Dillon’s_Rule.pdf. Also see NRS 244.137(3) and 268.001(3).
18. See NRS 244.137(4) and 268.001(4).
19. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_rule_in_the_United_States. In Lamb v. Mirin, 90 Nev. 329, 526 P.2d 80, 82 (1974) our Supreme Court declared that “whenever a legislature sees fit to adopt a general scheme for the regulation of particular subject (here the powers of local government), local control over the same subject, through legislation, ceases.”
20. For an understanding of the District’s various reporting funds, the reader is directed to our Understanding The District’s Funds Structure discussion.
21. In other words, “only if the governing body approves the increase under a nonconsent item that is separately listed on the agenda for a regular meeting of the governing body, and the governing body determines that: (a) The increase is not prohibited by law; (b) The increase is necessary for the continuation or expansion of the purpose for which the enterprise fund was created; and, (c) All fees that are deposited in the enterprise fund are used solely for the purposes for which the fees are collected.”
22. Such as NRS 318.197(1).
23. Like Compass Realty’s Team Blair which represents that “IVGID operates multiple private district beaches along the Incline Village shoreline,” Brassie Group which represents that “the IVGID Picture Pass…unlocks four private beaches” and Kaili Sanchez who represents that . Or Mary Kleingartner & Ryan Mitchell who represent “Incline Beach, Burnt Cedar Beach, and Ski Beach are private beaches owned and managed by IVGID (Incline Village General Improvement District).” Or Alex Min and Tom Zikas who represent that “homeowners of Incline Village and Crystal Bay, Nevada enjoy access to…private beach(es).” Or Coldwell-Banker Select’s Jenna Lanini who represents IVGID’s “four (beaches are) private beaches, because the(y)…were deeded to a specific set of pre-1968 parcels and lakefront owners have their own frontage.” Or EXP Realty which represents that “Incline Village Homeowners Get Access to Tahoe’s Best Private Beaches.” After all, if you can’t believe your local licensed real estate professional, exactly who can you believe?
24. Which in its statement on summer 2025 Hyatt Hotel guest access to IVGID beaches represents that “as part of the(ir) resort fee, (hotel) guests will have access to two private local beaches: Incline…and Burnt Cedar Beach(es)” (both owned and operated by IVGID).
25. At the Board’s May 27, 2026 meeting Trustee Homan took the opportunity to respond to public comment which stated nothing is furnished to those real properties which are involuntarily assessed the RFF/BFF. The District livestreams its Board meetings. Trustee Homan’s response appears at 1:44:00-1:45:39 of the livestream for that meeting (“the 5/27/2026 livestream“). Thereat, he stated that if you live within the confines of Incline Village, payment entitles you to “free access to our private beaches.” According to him, “it’s what makes life here so grand.” We ask if you can’t believe your own GID Trustee about the non-public nature of the District’s beaches, exactly who can you believe?
26. See 89 Haw. 361, 973 P.2d 736, 741-42 (1999).
27. See Clean Water Coalition v. M Resort, LLC, 127 Nev. 301, 315, 255 P.3d 247 (2011).
28. Medeiros, supra, at 973 P.2d 742.
29. In that “the party paying the fee has the option of not utilizing the governmental service and thereby avoiding the charge” [see Medeiros, supra, at 973 P.2d 741 citing Vanceburg v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 571 F.2d 630, 644 n. 48 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, at 439 U.S. 818, 99 S.Ct. 79 (1978)]. “Subsequent to its opinion in Emerson College, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court…weakened its adherence to the second identifying factor described in Emerson College—voluntary receipt of the ‘service’—holding that ‘the element of choice is not a compelling consideration which can be used to invalidate an otherwise legitimate charge'” [see Nuclear Metals, Inc. v. Radioactive Waste Management Bd., 421 Mass. 196, 656 N.E.2d 563, 570 (1995)]. However, in our Special And Limited Circumstances Under Which The “Paid by Choice” Factor Applicable to All Fees Based on “The Right of a Governmental Entity as Proprietor of The Instrumentalities Used” Can Be Disregarded discussion, we demonstrate that this pillar remains as an identifying factor except when it comes to fees for municipal public health and sanitation services such as charges for the availability of municipal water [see Jones v. Water Commission of Detroit, 34 Mich 273, 275 (1876)] and sewer [see Ripperger v. Grand Rapids, 338 Mich. 682, 62 N.W.2d 585 (1954)].