We have elsewhere discussed how the Legislature has instructed we interpret the powers a GID may exercise. Here we discuss how courts have instructed the same subject matter. Although there are a number of judicially recognized rules for construing statutes, here we discuss five (5) of particular applicability¹. Initially, we refer the reader to our discussion of the powers a GID may exercise. Now with that said,

“Plain Language:” Nevada courts begin their inquiry with a statute’s “plain language.”² Where the language is plain and unambiguous on its face, it is not appropriate to resort to any ancillary construction aids³.

Inserting Words or Terms Not There: Because it is improper to “insert into statutes terms or provisions which are obviously not there,” courts are “reluctant to second-guess the wisdom of a statute and (for this reason they are)…unwilling to insert words…the court believes the Legislature left out, be it intentionally or inadvertently.”⁴

Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius: In other words, “the expression of one thing is (to) the exclusion of another.”⁵ Thus “when a statute limits a thing to be done (to) a particular mode, it includes the negative (insofar as) any other mode”⁶ is concerned.

Had The Legislature Intended: that which is not stated in a statute⁷, it certainly knew how to “express (those words)…in straightforward English.”⁸ Thus where it doesn’t, that means the omission was intentional.

Judicial Decisions From Other Jurisdictions: When a term is neither defined by a statute nor a local government’s highest judicial authority, because it “may have an accepted meaning in the area of law addressed by the statute(, or)…it may have been borrowed from another statute under which it had an accepted meaning⁹…or it may have had an accepted and specialized meaning at common law¹⁰, the accepted meaning governs and the word or phrase is considered a technical term or (one) ‘of art.’”¹¹ And in the “absence of contrary direction (it) may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, (and) not as departure from them.”¹²

Conclusion: So there you go! Whenever there is a question as to whether IVGID may exercise a particular power, and that question is not answered by Dillon’s Rule, the judicially recognized rules of construction outlined above prevail.

1. There are a whole lot more than five (5) rules or maxims. Here we concentrate on just five (5) of the more recognized.
2. See Arguello v. Sunset Station, Inc., 127 Nev. 365, 370, 252 P.3d 206, 209 (2011).
3. See State Farm Mut. v. Comm’r of Ins, 114 Nev. 535, 540, 958 P.2d 733 (1998); Erwin v. State of Nevada, 111 Nev. 1535, 1538, 908 P.2d 1367, 1369 (1995) [quoting Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Boulder City, 106 Nev. 497, 503, 797 P.2d 946, 949 (1990)]; and, Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 1298, 1302, 148 P.3d 790, 792-793 (2006).
4. See Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Gooding Cty., 159 Idaho 84, 356 P.3d 377, 382 (2015).
5. This maxim has been expressly recognized in Nevada in SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 75, 334 P.3d 408, 414 (2014).
6. See Nunez v. Sahara Nevada Corp., 677 F. Supp. 1471, 1474 (D. Nev. 1988).
7. Such as GIDs be empowered to fix standby service charges for the availability of use of recreational facilities rather than the services it furnishes.
8. See dissent of Justice Stevens in FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 66, 111 S.Ct. 403 (1990).
9. In appropriate circumstances, courts will assume that “adoption of the wording of a statute from another legislative jurisdiction carries with it the previous judicial interpretations of the wording” [see Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 26, 65 S.Ct. 1 (1944)].
10. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-740, 109 S.Ct. 2166 (1989).
11. See pages 7-8 of the Congressional Research Service, Larry M. Eig, Specialist in American Public Law, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends (September 24, 2014).
12. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263, 72 S.Ct. 240 (1952).