In a word (or series of words), twofold. First, the ability to exercise of municipal police powers. And second, relaxation of the strictly construed limitations imposed by Dillon’s Rule¹. So what are municipal police powers? Let’s begin by explaining what they’re not.

They do “not specifically refer to the right of state and local governments to create police forces. (Rather, they refer to)…the authority…(of) states under the Tenth (10th) Amendment to the U.S. Constitution…to regulate local matters concerning (the) health, safety, and morality of State residents…(In other words) the basic right of governments to make laws and regulations for the benefit of their communities’” inhabitants². Or stated differently, those laws and regulations providing for general governmental services they furnish³/the general-purpose powers they exercise⁴.

Counties Have Been Granted The Power to Furnish General Governmental Services: Just listen to NRS 244.137(6)(a) which instructs that

In order “to provide a board of county commissioners with the appropriate authority to address matters of local concern⁵ for the effective operation of county government, the provisions of NRS 244.137 to 244.146, inclusive…expressly grant (counties)…all powers necessary or proper…so…(their) county…board(s) may adopt…ordinances and implement and carry out…programs and functions for the effective operation of county government.” 

Moreover, and as elsewhere explained, counties have been granted the power to provide for the “public health, safety and welfare” of their inhabitants⁶.

Similarly, Incorporated Cities Have Been Granted The Power to Furnish General Governmental Services: Just listen to NRS 268.001(6)(a) which instructs that

In order “to provide the governing body of an incorporated city with the appropriate authority to address matters of local concern⁷ for the effective operation of city government…the governing body of an incorporated city (is)…expressly grant(ed)…all powers necessary or proper…so that the governing body may adopt city ordinances and implement and carry out city programs and functions for the effective operation of city government.”

Similarly, Unincorporated Towns Have Been Granted The Power to Furnish General Governmental Services: that provide for the “public health, safety and morals”⁸ of their citizenry. Therefore, to provide governing bodies of unincorporated towns⁹ with the appropriate authority to furnish those services,

“A town board or board of county commissioners may…provide (all sorts of) adequate, economical and efficient services to (its) inhabitants…to promote the(ir) general welfare”¹⁰ which include a myriad of “town services”¹¹ such as: law making/regulation¹²; punishment¹³; licensing¹⁴; establishing and maintaining a board of health¹⁵; taxing¹⁶; and, fire¹⁷ and police¹⁸ protection.

Moreover,Both Counties And Incorporated Cities Have Been Granted Powers Well in Excess of The Limitations of Dillon’s Rule: Let’s begin with counties. NRS 244.137(6)(b) instructs that

“To provide a board of county commissioners with the appropriate authority to address matters of local concern…Dillon’s Rule (is expressly)…modif(ied)…so that if there is any fair or reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a power of the (county) board…it must be presumed…(it) has the power unless th(at) presumption is rebutted by evidence of a contrary intent by the Legislature.”

Now let’s examine incorporated cities. NRS 268.001(6)(b) instructs that

“To provide the governing body of an incorporated city with the appropriate authority to address matters of local concern…Dillon’s Rule as applied to the governing (is)…modif(ied)…so that if there is any fair or reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a power…to address a matter of local concern, it must be presumed…the governing body has the power unless the presumption is rebutted by evidence of a contrary intent by the Legislature.”

In Contrast, GIDs Have Not Been Granted The Power to Furnish Any of These General Governmental Services: As elsewhere discussed, GIDs are limited purpose special districts along the lines of vector control (mosquitos), library, fire, water, sewer and cemetery districts. They are creatures of statute, and in Nevada those statutes are set forth at Title 25 of Chapter NRS 318¹⁹. Take a long hard look at NRS 318. Do you the reader see any language which authorizes GIDs to provide for the health, safety or general welfare of their inhabitants? How about making laws? Or legislating? Given legal maxims are “established principle(s) or proposition(s) of law, and a species of aphorism and general maxim,”²⁰ the maxim Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius instructs that “the special mention of one thing operates as the exclusion of things differing from it.” As applied here, the fact NRS 318 expressly fails to grant GIDs the power to provide for the health, safety or general welfare of its inhabitants, and to make laws or legislate, means these powers and others like them simply do not exist. By implication, or otherwise.

Nor Unlike Counties And Cities, GIDs Have Not Been Granted Powers in Excess of The Limitations of Dillon’s Rule: Given the Nevada Supreme Court has adopted Dillon’s Rule²¹, GIDs are subject to this Rule²² insofar as their rule making powers are concerned. The reader may recall¹ that Dillon’s Rule instructs

“Local government powers are…limited and only extend to those: 1) granted in express words; 2) necessarily implied or…incident to…powers expressly granted; and, 3) absolutely essential to the declared objects and purposes of the (municipal) corporation – not simply convenient, but indispensable.”

With this in mind, take a long hard look at NRS 318. Do you see similar language which runs contra to the express limitations in Dillon’s Rule? Just like NRS 244.137(6)(b) [insofar as counties] and 268.001(6)(a) [insofar as incorporated cities] do? No you don’t! And that’s because there are no modifications to Dillon’s Rule insofar as GIDs are concerned²³. Which means that “if there is any fair or reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a power, that doubt is (to be) resolved against the governing body…and the power is denied.”²⁴ Meaning, it must be presumed a GID Board has none!

So there you have it. Unlike true municipalities, the powers IVGID can exercise are far less than those of a county, incorporated city or unincorporated town, and expressly do not extend to providing for the health, safety and general welfare of its inhabitants. Therefore as the reader examines the powers IVGID actually exercises/has in the past exercised, we hope you hold it accountable to the limits, restrictions and consequences discussed above.

And now you know!

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1. For a discussion of Dillon’s Rule, refer to our discussion of the Legitimate Powers a GID May Exercise.
2. See https://municipal.ushttps://municipal.uslegal.com/police-powers/legal.com/police-powers/.
3. See https://www.census.gov/newsroom/cspan/govts/20120301_cspan_govts_def_3.pdf.
4. See http://www.ca-ilg.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/local_agency_powers_and_limitations.pdf.
5. The term “matter(s) of local concern (also) means (matters affecting)…public health, safety and welfare” [see NRS 244.143(2)].
6. See NRS 244.143(2)(a).
7. The term “matter(s) of local concern mean(s)…any matter(s) that (a) primarily affect…or impact…areas located in (an) incorporated city, or persons who reside, work, visit or are otherwise present in areas located in the city, and does not have a significant effect or impact on areas located in other cities or counties…The term (expressly) includes…public health, safety and welfare in the city” (see NRS 268.003).
8. See NRS 269.190–269.270.
9. “Town Boards” (see NRS 269.016).
10. See NRS 269.128.
11. See NRS 269.575(1).
12. See NRS 269.155(1).
13. See NRS 269.160, 269.205 and 269.215.
14. See NRS 269.175.
15. See NRS 269.190.
16. See NRS 269.170(1), 269.225, 269.240(1) and 269.255(1).
17. See NRS 269.250(1).
18. See NRS 269.235(1).
19. See Public Organizations for Community Service.
20. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_maxim.
21. See Tucker v. Mayor and Bd. of Alderman, 4 Nev. 20, 26 (1868); State ex rel. Rosenstock v. Swift, 11 Nev. 128 (1876).
22. Both NRS 244.137(2) and 268.001(2) instruct that “in Nevada’s jurisprudence, the Nevada Supreme Court has adopted and applied Dillon’s Rule to county, city and other local governments.”
23. See NRS 244.137(7)(a) and 268.001(7)(a) which both declare that “the provisions of [NRS 244.137(7) and 268.001(7)]…must not be interpreted to modify Dillon’s Rule with regard to: any local governing body other than a board of county commissioners (or the governing body of an)…incorporated city.” Therefore insofar as GIDs are concerned, the restrictions of Dillon’s Rule are mandatory.
24. See NRS 244.137(4) and 268.001(4); https://www.nvbar.org/wp-content/uploads/NevLawyer_June_2013_Dillon’s_Rule.pdf.