Given we’ve shared that:

1. A general improvement district’s (“GID’s”) Board of Trustees’ (“Board’s”) power to “fix, and from time to time increase or decrease…rates, tolls or charges other than special assessments” flows from NRS 318.197(1);

2. NRS 318.197(1) instructs those exactions “may…includ(e)…service charges…for…facilities” as well as “standby service charges, for…the availability of service(s)…furnished by the District;”

3. And for this reason and others, District staff and past/current Boards have labeled the Recreation (“RFF”) and Beach (“BFF”) Facility Fees the District assesses “recreation standby and service charges;”¹

Similar to our What Are Service Charges For Services and What Are Service Charges For Facilities discussions, here we examine what are:

1. “Standby service charges for…the availability of” facilities;

2. Whether they are assessed by the District; and if so,

3. Are they the Recreation (“RFF”) and Beach (“BFF”) Facility Fees staff and past/current Boards have represented/represent¹?

Recall that just because the District represents the RFF/BFF are “standby service charges,”¹ doesn’t necessarily make them so. That’s because

“Courts will determine and classify (monetary exactions) on the basis of realities”² looking to their “operating incidence”³ rather than (their) specially descriptive phrase(s).”⁴

Much the same as our What Are Standby Service Charges For Services discussion, nowhere is the term “standby service charges, for…the availability of” facilities defined. Nowhere in NRS 318, nowhere anyplace else in the NRS, and nowhere in Nevada judicial decisions. Notwithstanding, because

“Courts will determine and classify (monetary exactions) on the basis of realities”² looking to their “operating incidence”³ rather than (their) specially descriptive phrase(s),”⁴

As we have concluded, the term “standby service charge” is one of art which is accumulated in the legal tradition and meaning of decades if not centuries of practice. And for this reason the term means:

1. Some sort of monetary levy against⁵ the real “property to be (directly) benefited”⁶ [as opposed to “the general public, and not for the comfort and use of individual customers (who)…have no control over the provision or use of” public recreation”⁷];

2. Imposed for the mere availability to access and receive⁶ some type of public health and sanitation⁸ service⁹ (rather than facility);

3. Delivered¹⁰ by means of some physical connection⁶ or other similar means capable of connection¹¹, to the real property directly benefited⁶;

4. “Even though [that service (rather than facility)] might not actually be used at the present time;”⁶ and,

5. Where the real property assessed is not currently a customer because once property becomes an actual customer of the services (or here facilities) furnished, by definition, it is no longer “‘standing by’ (n)or (is the service) ‘immediately available’ to be connected to the property to be benefited.”¹² Instead, “the benefit…is in fact (actually being) provid(ed).”⁶

Therefore unlike service or facility fees per se, “standby service charges”don’t pay for actual access to nor use of services or facilities¹³. At best, they pay for the mere availability to access, and access services⁶. And moreover, only public health and sanitation services¹⁴ (like water and sewer¹⁵)!

So does IVGID have the power to assess “standby service charges, for…the (mere) availability of” facilities? Although at first blush you might answer “yes,” in-truth-and-in fact the answer’s “NO!” That’s because no such beast exists. Not in NRS 318.197(1), and not in any of the reported cases. Yet notwithstanding, listen to what staff and past/current Boards regularly do:

“Each year, the District establishes…annual Recreation…and Beach Facility Fee(s)…The Board traditionally approves a Resolution which at ¶4(b)¹ describes these fees as “standby and service charges…(for) the availability of the use of IVGID’s beaches; boat launch ramp; Championship golf course; Mountain golf course; tennis facilities; the Chateau and Aspen Grove; Diamond Peak Ski Resort, and Recreation Center.”¹⁶ And at ¶6 of that Resolution, a Report¹⁷ is incorporated therein which at ¶I describes these fees as “annual charges…for the availability of use of the recreational facilities above described.”¹⁶

And now you know!

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1. Take a look at the Report the Board typically approves at the same time it adopts a Resolution each year which fixes the RFF/BFF and orders their collection on the county tax roll. The title refers to these charges as “Recreation Standby And Service Charges” [an example of the Report adopted for FY 2025-26 appears at pages 112-117 of the packet of materials prepared by staff in anticipation of the Board’s May 30, 2025 meeting (“the 5/30/2025 Board packet“)]. Additionally, ¶4(b) of the Resolution itself [an example of the resolution adopted for FY 2025-26 (No. 1917) appears at pages 108-111 of the 5/30/2025 Board packet] refers to the RFF/BFF as “standby and service charges for…the availability of the use of IVGID’s” beaches and public recreation facilities. Finally, take a look at ¶37 of Ordinance No. 7. There the term “Recreation Standby and Service Charge” is defined as “the…Recreation Fee…assessed by the District (i.e., the RFF/BFF) to support recreation services, programs and facilities.”
2. See Hukle v. City of Huntington, 134 W.Va. 249, 58 S.E.2d 780, 783 (1950); See Clean Water Coalition v. The M Resort, LLC, 127 Nev. 301, 255 P. 3d 247, 256 (2011) citing State v. Medeiros, 89 Haw. 361, 973 P.2d 736, 741 (1999).
3. See Emerson College v, City of Boston, 391 Mass. 415, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (1984),
4. See Stewarts’ Pharmacies v. Fase, 43 Haw. 131, 144 (1959) reh’g denied at 43 Haw. 166.
5. See Solvang Mun. Improvement Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 112 Cal.App.3d 545, 552, 169 Cal.Rptr. 391 (1980).
6. See Kennedy v. City of Ukiah, 69 Cal. App. 3d 545, 553, 138 Cal.Rptr. 207 (1977); San Diego Cty. Water Auth. v. Metro. Water Dist., 117 Cal.App.4th 13, 27, 11 Cal.Rptr. 446, 457 (2004).
7. See Okeson v. City of Seattle, 150 Wn.2d 540, 78 P.3d 1279, 1285 (2003)].
8. See McMillan v. Texas National Resources Conservation Comm’n, 983 S.W.2d 359, 365 (1998).
9. Primarily water and/or sewer [see Medeiros,supra, at 89 Haw. 367, 973 P.2d 742; Chapman v. City of Albuquerque, 65 N.M. 228, 335 P.2d 558, 562 (1959); Graham v. City of Lakewood Village, 796 S.W.2d 800, 801 (1990); Lakeside Utilities Corp. v. Bernum, 5 Ohio.St.3d 99, 449 N.E.2d 430, 431 (1983)].
10. See State v. City of Port Orange, 650 So.2d 1, 3 (1994); Chapman, supra, at 335 P. 561.
11. In other words, standby service charges require services to actually be “standing by” or “immediately available” to be delivered (see Chapman, supra, at 335 P. 564).
12. See San Diego Cty. Water Auth., supra, at 117 Cal.App.4th 27.
13. Because the services or facilities the subject thereof are not “standing by” or “immediately available” to be connected to the property to be benefited; (they are) in fact providing the benefit.”¹³
14. See Bloom v. City of Fort Collins, 784 P.2d 304, 310 (Colo.1989); Loup-Miller Construction Co. v. City & County of Denver, 676 P.2d 1170 (1984).
15. In other words, expressly not public recreation services.
16. In other words, recreation facilities!
17. For fiscal year 2025-26 that Report was labeled a “Report For Collection on the County Tax Roll of Recreation Standby and Service Charges.”