As we’ve elsewhere discussed, the District not only has the power to levy an ad valorem tax against all non-exempt parcels within its boundaries, but it actually takes advantage of this power¹. However, there are explicit monetary limits on the permissible amounts as well as yearly increase amounts. For instance, NRS 361.453(1) instructs that:

With exceptions², “the total ad valorem tax levy for all public purposes must not exceed $3.64 on each $100 of assessed valuation.”

For purposes of this discussion NRS 361.4723(1)(b) instructs that:

Because “an increase in the tax bill of the owner of a home by more than 3 percent over the tax bill…for the previous year constitutes a severe economic hardship within the meaning of subsection 10 of Section 1 of Article 10 of the Nevada Constitution, the Legislature (has) direct(ed) a partial abatement of taxes for such…single family residence(s of)…homeowners (of their)…“primary residence(s to)…(a) the amount of all the ad valorem taxes (1) levied…on the property for the immediately preceding fiscal year…and…three percent of the amount…for that fiscal year.”

In other words, a maximum three percent (3%) annual increase. And NRS 361.4722(1) instructs that:

“The owner of any parcel or other taxable unit of property (other than the primary single family residence of that owner)…is entitled to a partial abatement of the ad valorem taxes levied in a county on that property each fiscal year…by adding (a) the amount of all the ad valorem taxes (1) levied…on the property for the immediately preceding fiscal year…and (b) a percentage of the amount determined pursuant to paragraph (a) which is…(not) greater (than)…eight percent.”

In other words, a maximum eight percent (8%) annual increase.

Therefore in accordance with NRS 361.4723(3),

“The amount of any reduction in the ad valorem taxes levied in a county for a fiscal year as a result of the application of the (foregoing) provisions…must be deducted from the amount of ad valorem taxes each taxing entity would otherwise be entitled to receive for that fiscal year.”

So why are we discussing taxes under this topic? Because the limitations above-identified are not the case when it comes to the District’s RFF/BFF! In other words, call a tax a fee, and then the limitations applicable to taxes no longer apply.

Notwithstanding, and as we’ve elsewhere demonstrated, “the crucial factor in determining whether a municipal charge for services [‘based on the rights of (a governmental) entity as proprietor of the instrumentalities used’³] constitutes a valid…fee is whether the charge is intended to cover the (reasonable) cost of…providing a service.”⁴

“Where “the ‘fee’ unreasonably exceeds the value of the specific services for which it is charged it will be held (to be) invalid”⁵)…in relation to the…cost (of the)…goods or services for which they are imposed.”⁶

And proportionate “in relation to the…cost (of the) goods or services for which they are imposed,”⁷

Therefore the use of monies generated by the RFF/BFF for some other District function than that represented in consideration of payment would be tantamount to requiring the class of persons responsible for the fee⁸ to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of providing revenues to defray general governmental expenses unrelated to the purpose for which the fees were imposed. The effect of such expenditures would be to render the RFF/BFF the functional equivalent of a tax⁹. Even if there were no evidence¹⁰ that revenues generated by the RFF/BFF have been more than the costs the District incurs to make the beaches and public recreation facilities, respectively, available to be used by those who are assessed, the fact remains that these fees could be utilized in the future contrary to the above-limitations. Such use cannot be squared with the principle that a legitimate fee must be reasonably designed to defray the expenses for the particular service for which the fee is imposed¹¹. There is a theory that when a part of an ordinance (or here resolution) is determined to be invalid, the remainder nonetheless may be given effect unless the remainder is so inextricably related to the void provision as to be incapable of being effectuated in accordance with the overriding legislative purpose¹². We disagree.

“A court cannot apportion (a) charge or ascertain and allow such portion as it might find reasonable, assuming, but not deciding, that the city, under its organic law, is authorized to impose regular charges for such (matters¹³)…The entire charge must therefore be declared invalid.”¹⁴

At the Board’s May 30, 2025 meeting its Director of Finance presented a memorandum whereby she included an historical summary of RFF/BFF amounts from 2008-09 through 2025-26. Through 2024-25 the annual RFF per parcel/dwelling unit ranged from $100-$730, and the annual BFF per parcel/dwelling unit with beach access ranged from $100-$680. For 2023-24 the RFF stood at $0.00. And it was increased to $720 for 2025-26! For 2024-25 the BFF stood at $300.00. And it was increased to $655 for 2025-26! Thus combined, our annual recreation fee stood at $450 per parcel/dwelling unit for 2024-25, and it was increased to $1,375 per parcel/dwelling unit for 2025-26. Slightly lower than the $1,500 per parcel/dwelling unit recommended by the General Manager’s (“GM’s”) hand picked Capital Investment Committee¹⁵ deemed necessary “to meet the ongoing operating costs of the community service venues along with the investment incorporated into the capital budget.”

Thus for a number of those parcels in our community, the RFF/BFF now totals more than their ad valorem taxes. This might not be such a problem if payment of the RFF/BFF were voluntary, and one could decide whether or not to pay. But as we’ve demonstrated, they’re not! And now you know.

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1. See NRS 318.225.
2. There are a slew of statutory exceptions we won’t be addressing insofar as this topic is concerned.
3. See Emerson College v. City of Boston, 391 Mass. 415, 424, 462 N.E.2d 1098 (1984).
4. See Rizzo v. City of Philadelphia, 668 A.2d 236, 238 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
5. See Executive Aircraft Consulting, supra, at 252 Kan. 426 quoting National Cable Television Ass’n v. F.C.C., 554 F.2d 1094, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
6. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Lanzaro, 140 N.J. 244, 658 A.2d 282, 288 (1995).
7. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Lanzaro, 140 N.J. 244, 658 A.2d 282, 288 (1995).
8. The owners of local non-exempt parcels/dwelling units (see Policy Nos. 16.1.1.2.1 & 2),
9. See Zelinger v. City & County of Denver, 724 P.2d 1356, 1358 (1986).
10. But unfortunately there is. For examples that the RFF/BFF are used to pay for expenditures having nothing to do with the costs the District incurs to make its public recreation/beach facilities available to those parcels which are involuntarily assessed, please refer to our Recreation And Beach Facility Fees According to Us discussion.
11. See Zelinger, supra, at 724 P.2d 1359; Loup-Miller Construction Co. v. City & County of Denver, 676 P.2d 1170, 1175-76 (1984); Western Heights Land Corp. v. City of Fort Collins, 146 Colo. 464, 468-69, 362 P.2d 155, 158 (1961); O. Reynolds, Jr., Local Government Law §105.
12. See Reams v. City of Grand Junction, 676 P.2d 1189 (1984); §2-4-204, 1B C.R.S. (1973).
13. That would be legislating, wouldn’t it?
14. See City of Madera v. Black, 181 Cal. 306. 315, 184 P. 297 (1919).
15. See the GM’s May 21, 2025 memorandum.