In a word, no!

Given “the Nevada Constitution is The ‘Supreme Law of The State which `control[s] over any conflicting statutory provisions,'”¹ “it is fundamental to our federal, constitutional system of government that a State legislature (or here a limited purpose special district² doesn’t) ‘ha(ve)…the power to enact any law conflicting with the federal constitution, the laws of Congress, or the constitution of its particular State.'”³

With that said, although NRS 318.197(1) empowers general improvement district (“GID”) Boards to “fix, and from time to time increase or decrease (various)…rates, tolls or charges,” nowhere does it nor any other NRS authorize those Boards to selectively exempt persons, corporations, associations, real property, or governments otherwise subject to assessment from the “indebtedness, liability, or obligation” created as a result of those monetary exactions. Although Article 10, §1(8) of the Constitution allows the governing board of a political subdivision to “exempt by law property used for municipal, educational, literary, scientific or other charitable purposes” from property taxation, there’s no similar exception and exclusion when it comes to rates, tolls, charges or fees⁴. Nor does the District have the power to pass any law⁵. Yet ¶I(D) to the NRS 318.201(1) report(s)⁶ the District regularly adopts (pursuant to ¶6) of the Resolution [i.e., the equivalent of a local or special law (see our discussion below)] which fixes the RFF/BFF and orders their collection on the county tax roll⁷, provides for a series of “exceptions and exclusions…from the charges imposed.”⁸ As does ¶2.6 of Policy No. 16.1.1⁹, a “Recreation Roll Policy.” Because the District is not a general government, and for this reason has no power to adopt laws nor pass legislation to fill arguable voids created by the State Legislature; and, Dillon’s Rule expressly expressly prohibits local governments like IVGID from exercising: “(a) those powers (not) granted in express terms by the Nevada Constitution or statute; (b) (nor) those…(not) necessarily (n)or fairly implied in (n)or incident to th(os)e powers expressly granted; (c) (nor) those (not) essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the (District) and not merely convenient but indispensable;”¹⁰ these exceptions and exclusions are examples of impermissible¹¹ Article 4, Sections 20, 21 of the Nevada Constitution local or special laws not capable of uniform application throughout the State.

The Resolution The District Adopts Each Year Pursuant to NRS 318.201(9)¹² Which Fixes Annual “Standby and Service Charges¹³ For…The Availability of The Use of IVGID’s” Beaches And Enumerated Public Recreation Facilities And Orders Their Collection on The County Tax Roll¹⁴, is The Equivalent of a “Law” For Purposes of Article 4, Sections 20 and 21 of The Nevada Constitution: As limited purpose special districts², GIDs are granted those basic powers recited in their initiating ordinances

“For which the(y were)…created [for instance, (and) by way of illustration, ‘for paving, curb and gutters, sidewalks, storm drainage and sanitary sewer improvements within the district’]”¹⁵ with the proviso they “be one or more of those (powers expressly) authorized in NRS 318.116¹⁶, as supplemented by the sections of this chapter¹⁷ (NRS 318) designated therein.”⁸

Unlike true municipalities like counties or cities¹⁸, GIDs have no power to adopt laws nor pass legislation, nor exercise municipal police¹⁹ powers to provide for the health, safety and general welfare of their citizenry²⁰. Nevertheless, enactments such as Resolution No. 1917 are the equivalent of “laws” given NRS 318.015(1) instructs that

GIDs “having the purposes, powers, rights, privileges and immunities provided in this chapter…serve a public use and…promote the health, safety, prosperity, security and general welfare of the inhabitants…of the State of Nevada.”

Thus enactments such as Resolution No. 1917 represent

“Principles and regulations established in a community by some authority…applicable to its people…recognized and enforced by judicial decision”²¹ for the benefit of others²².

The Resolution The District Adopts Each Year Pursuant to NRS 318.201(9) is The Equivalent of a Local or Special Law:

“[I]f a statute be either a special or local law, or both, and comes within any one or more of the cases enumerated in section 20²³…and in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable…such statute is unconstitutional.”²⁴

What is a Local Law? “A law is local if it operates over ‘a particular locality instead of over the whole territory of the State.’”²⁵ Our Supreme Court has explained the prohibition against local and special laws under Article 4, Section 20 as follows:

“[I]f a statute be either a special or local law, or both, and (it) comes within any one or more of the cases enumerated in section 20, then its constitutionality depends upon whether a general law can be made applicable.”²³ “If the statute be special or local, or both, but (it) does not come within any of the cases enumerated in section 20,” it is “not ipso facto unconstitutional²⁶.

What is a General Law? “A general law is one that is applied uniformly.”²⁷

“It applies equally to all persons embraced in a class founded upon some natural, intrinsic, or constitutional distinction.”²⁸ “A general law should always be construed…to be applicable in all cases where the subject is one in which from its very nature the entire people of the State have an interest.”²⁹

What is a Special Law? “A law is special if it ‘pertain[s] to a part of a class as opposed to all of a class.'”³⁰ It is one that

“Confers particular privileges or imposes peculiar disabilities, or burdensome conditions in the exercise of a common right (or) upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected, from the general body of those who stand in precisely the same relation to the subject of the law.”³¹

The Resolution The District Adopts Each Year Pursuant to NRS 318.201(9) is Neither The Equivalent of a General Law, Nor is it Applied Uniformly: First of all, it is a “case…enumerated in the preceding section” (i.e., Article 4, Section 20). And second of all, it is a “case…where a general law can be made applicable, yet the Resolution the Board adopt are neither the equivalent of general laws nor of uniform operation throughout the State. NRS 318.197(1) is certainly a general law given it defines the types of rates, tolls and charges all GIDs can fix. It has been made applicable to all GIDs throughout the State. But rather than “fix(ing)…service charges and standby service charges, for…the availability of (recreation) service(s)” which is what NRS 318.197(1) expressly allows, the Resolutions the Board adopt fix “charges (for)…the availability of the use of” enumerated beach and public recreation and facilities¹³. This makes the District’s Resolutions the equivalent of special laws, and of non-uniform operation throughout the State.

Although a local or special law may be upheld so long as: (1) it does not come within any of the cases enumerated in Nevada Constitution Article 4, Section 20; and, (2) a general law could not have been made applicable;”³² because the District’s Resolutions⁵ which adopt the RFF/BFF create exemptions that pertain only to the locality or to the part of the class affected by the laws, and not to statewide concerns;³³ we submit the RFF/BFF are unconstitutional fees³² and thus invalid taxes³⁴.

Legitimate “Fees” Can be Transformed Into “Taxes” When They’ve Been Adopted in Violation of The Nevada Constitution: In Clean Water, supra, at 127 Nev. 318, our Supreme Court found that a “fee” collected for capital improvement projects and sewer services³⁵ was an impermissible tax because it was the product of a local or special law in violation of Article 4, Section 20 of the Nevada Constitution.

“Fees assessed as legitimate fees can be transformed into impermissible taxes (where) they are” adopted in violation of the Constitution.

Conclusion: “The Hawaii Supreme Court in (State of Hawaii v.)Medeiros[, 89 Haw. 361, 973 P.2d 736 (1999)] adopted a modified version of the test articulated by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Emerson College” [v. City of Boston, 39 Mass. 415, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (1984)] for determining whether a monetary exaction represents a “fee” or a “tax.” Where “th(e) criteria (identified) fit the charge, (Medeiros concluded) it is a fee.”³⁶ And where they don’t, Medeiros concluded it’s a tax³⁷. Here because the District’s adoption of the RFF/BFF is the product of “local or special laws (which) address particular concerns that pertain only to the locality or to the part of the class affected by the laws, and not to statewide concerns,”³⁸ they have been “transformed into a local and special tax (and have become)…a basis for determining unconstitutionality under Article 4, Section 20 as an “assessment and collection of taxes for state, county, and township purposes.” Or stated otherwise, “the charge (doesn’t) appl(y) to the direct beneficiary of a particular service”³⁹.

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1. See City of Fernley v. State, Dep’t of Taxation, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 4, 366 P.3d 699, 706 (2016), quoting Thomas v. Nev. Yellow Cab Corp., 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 52, 327 P.3d 518, 521 (2014) and Clean Water Coalition v. M Resort, 127 Nev. 301, 309, 255 P.3d 247 (2011).
2. See our What Are General Improvement District (“GID”) discussion.
3. See City of Fernley, Id.; Thomas, supra, at 327 P.3d at 520-521, quoting State ex rel. Beatty v. Rhodes, 3 Nev. 240, 250 (1867).
4. Which prohibits the District from “insert(ing) words…the court believes the Legislature left out, be it intentionally or inadvertently” (see our How Courts Have Instructed We Construe The Powers a GID May Exercise discussion).
5. See our Those Powers All GIDs Are Authorized to Exercise discussion.
6. For an example of such a Report, consider the Report adopted at the Board’s May 30, 2025 meeting.
7. For an example of such a Resolution, the reader is directed to Resolution No. 1917.
8. Namely “lots, parcels and areas of land used, or the portions thereof used, or intended to be used, for religious purposes or educational purposes; common areas without occupied structures appurtenant to a condominium or townhouse cluster; and publicly owned lands (and)…in addition, any parcel which is (1) undeveloped, and (2) subject to a deed restriction, acceptable to IVGID staff, preventing any and all development of the parcel in perpetuity, which deed restriction is recorded in the Washoe County Recorder’s Office, and (3) whose owner agrees to waive in perpetuity on his own behalf as well as on behalf of his successors and assigns any right to demand in the future any recreation privileges arising from or associated with said parcel.”
9. Which “exempt(s) real property…that is located within the current geographic boundaries of the District but which Washoe County has exempted from paying Washoe County property tax (as well as)…includ(ing) but…not (being) limited to, real property that is used or intended for use for religious or educational purposes, condominium and town house common areas that do not include any Dwelling Units, and publicly owned property.”
10. See NRS 244.137(3) and 268.001(3).
11. “The legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases…releasing the indebtedness, liability, or obligation of any corporation, association, or person to the state, or to any county, town, or city of this state.”
12. An example of that resolution (for fiscal year 2022-23, i.e., No. 1893) appears at pages 228-231 of the packet of materials prepared by staff in anticipation of the Board’s May 26, 2022 meeting (“the5/26/2022 Board packet“).
13. See ¶4 at page 229 of the 5/26/2022 Board packet.
14. See ¶8 at pages 230-231 of the 5/26/2022 Board packet.
15. See NRS 318.055(4)(b).
16. NRS 318.116 instructs that “any one, all or any combination of the following basic powers may be granted to a district in proceedings for its organization, or its reorganization pursuant to NRS 318.077, and all provisions in this chapter supplemental thereto [ i.e., “1. Furnishing electric light and power…2. Extermination and abatement of mosquitoes, flies, other insects, rats, and liver fluke or Fasciola hepatica…3. Furnishing facilities or services for public cemeteries…4. Furnishing facilities for swimming pools…5. Furnishing facilities for television…6. Furnishing facilities for FM radio…7. Furnishing streets and alleys…8. Furnishing curbs, gutters and sidewalks…9. Furnishing sidewalks…10. Furnishing facilities for storm drainage or flood control…11. Furnishing sanitary facilities for sewerage…12. Furnishing facilities for lighting streets…13. Furnishing facilities for the collection and disposal of garbage and refuse…14. Furnishing recreational facilities…15. Furnishing facilities for water…16. Furnishing fencing…17. Furnishing facilities for protection from fire…18. Furnishing energy for space heating…19. Furnishing emergency medical se0rvices…20. Control of noxious weeds…(and,) 21. Establishing, controlling, managing and operating an area or zone for the preservation of one or more species or subspecies of wildlife that has been declared endangered or threatened pursuant to the federal Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§1531, et seq.”], or as may be otherwise provided by statute [such as a GID’s “implied powers” (see NRS 318.210 which states that “the board shall have and exercise all rights and powers necessary or incidental to or implied from the specific powers granted in this chapter”).
17. Such as a GID’s “power of eminent domain and dominant eminent domain…to take any property necessary to the exercise of the powers granted, both within and without the district” (see NRS 318.190).
18. See our What is a Special District And How it Differs From a True Municipality discussion.
19. This “power does not specifically refer to the right of state and local governments to create police forces. (Rather, it refers to)…the authority…to states under the Tenth (10th) Amendment to the Constitution…to regulate local matters concerning health, safety, and morality of state residents…(In other words,) the basic right of governments to make laws and regulations for the benefit of their communities” (go to https://municipal.ushttps://municipal.uslegal.com/police-powers/legal.com/police-powers/).
20. In other words, those providing general governmental services (see https://www.census.gov/newsroom/cspan/govts/20120301_cspan_govts_def_3.pdf) exercising general-purpose powers (see http://www.ca-ilg.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/local_agency_powers_and_limitations.pdf).
21. Go to https://www.dictionary.com/browse/law.
22. See NRS 318.015(1) which instructs that “districts having the purposes, powers, rights, privileges and immunities provided in this chapter…promote the health, safety, prosperity, security and general welfare of the inhabitants…of the State of Nevada.”
23. Such as “for the assessment and collection of taxes for state, county, and township purposes.”
24. See Conservation District v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, 116, 45 P.2d 779, 782 (1935); Clean Water Coalition, supra, at 127 Nev. 310.
25. See City of Fernley, supra, at 366 P.3d 699.
26. See Nev. Const. art. 4, §§20, 21; W.R. Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, 352-53, 172 P.2d 158, 169 (1946).
27. See Clean Water, Id.
28. See Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 795 P.2d 622, 636 (Utah 1990).
29. See Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322, 336 (1873); Clean Water, supra, at 127 Nev. 321].
30. See Clean Water, supra, at 127 Nev. 312.
31. See Clean Water Coalition, supra, at 127 Nev. 311 quoting Colman, supra, at 795 P.2d 636; State of Nevada v. Cal. M. Co., 15 Nev. 234, 249 (1880).
32. See Nev. Const. art. 4, §21; Anthony v. State of Nevada, 94 Nev. 337, 580 P.2d 939 (1978); Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, 96, 177 P.2d 677, 686 (1947); Conservation District v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, 45 P.2d 779 (1935).
33. See Clean Water, supra, at 127 Nev. 321.
34. See United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572, 51 S.Ct. 278 (1931).
35. Id., at 127 Nev. 316.
36. See Medeiros, supra, at 973 P.2d 742-745.
37. See Clean Water, supra, at 127 Nev. 315; Douglas Co. Contractors v. Douglas Co., 112 Nev. 1452, 1457, 929 P.2d 253, 256 (1996); State ex. rel. City of Reno v. Boyd, 27 Nev. 249, 256, 74 P. 654, 655 (1903); 71 Am. Jur. 2d §13, State and Local Taxation (2001).
38. See Clean Water, supra, at 127 Nev. 321.
39. The first prong of the criteria identified in Medeiros for fees.