Courts have oftentimes been asked to define the characteristics of a “tax,” and how they differ from other kinds of monetary exactions such as “fees” and “special assessments.” The distinction is one that is not always observed with nicety in the judicial decisions¹ addressing this question. Notwithstanding, and as elsewhere explained, just because staff and past/current Boards have labeled many of the District’s involuntarily assessed monetary exactions² “fees,”  doesn’t necessarily make them so. That’s because

“The nature of (a)…charge…(the) law imposes is not determined by the label given…but (rather)…its operating incidence.”³

Therefore whenever the question is raised,

“Courts will determine and classify (monetary exactions) on the basis of realities”⁴ rather than labels, looking to their ‘operative effect.’”⁵ Especially when as here, the labels given⁵ were “undoubtedly drafted with [NRS 318.197(1)’s] permissive “standby service charges…for the availability of service” language firmly (and disingenuously⁶) in mind.”⁷

So with this introduction in mind, we ask: what are the “operating incidences”³ of the District’s various monetary exactions? What is their “operative effect?”⁵ What are their realities⁴?

Generally speaking, “the word ‘taxes’ is very comprehensive, and properly includes…all burdens, charges and impositions by virtue of the taxing power.”⁸ Typically they represent:

“Burdens or charges imposed by legislative authority on persons or property to raise money for public purposes (or ‘an imposition for the supply of the public treasury’⁹). Or “enforced¹⁰ proportional contributions from persons and property, levied by the state…or its municipal subdivisions¹¹…by virtue of (their) sovereignty for the (financial) support of government…for all public needs…where the special benefits derived from their performance is merged in(to) the general benefit.”⁹

According to the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Clean Water Coalition, supra, at 127 Nev. 314-15,

“A tax…is…an exaction of money for the purpose of generating revenue¹²…(It) is compulsory¹³ and…entitles the taxpayer to receive nothing except the governmental rights enjoyed by all citizens.”

So the simple answer to the question what is a tax, is that “if th(e above) criteria fit the charge…it…is…a” tax¹⁴.

And now you know!

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1. See Dickson, Sheriff v. Jeff. Co. Bd. of Education, 311 Ky. 781, 786, 225 S.W.2d 672 (1949).
2. Such as its Recreation (“RFF”) and Beach (“BFF”) Facility Fees, defensible space fees, solid waste “franchise fees,” etc.
3. See Clean Water Coalition v. The M Resort, LLC, 127 Nev. 301, 255 P. 3d 247, 256 (2011) citing State v. Medeiros, 89 Haw. 361, 973 P.2d 736, 741 (1999).
4. See Hukle v. City of Huntington, 134 W.Va. 249, 58 S.E.2d 780, 783 (1950); Clean Water Coalition,supra, at 127 Nev. 315.
5. The District’s RFF/BFF for instance.
6. Disingenuously because it is based upon the premise the ends justify the means.
7. See Rider v. County of San Diego, 1 Cal.4th 1, 15, 820 P.2d 10 (1991).
8. See McCandless v. Campbell, 20 Haw. 411, 420 (1911).
9. See Hawaii Insurers Council v. Lingle, 120 Haw. 51, 59-60, 201 P.3d 564 (2008).
10. In other words, the assessee has no choice insofar as whether to pay.
11. GIDs are such subdivisions inasmuch as they expressly “authorized ‘shall have power and authority to levy and collect general (ad valorem) taxes on and against all taxable property within the district’ (see NRS 318.225).
12. See Douglas Co. Contractors v. Douglas Co., 112 Nev. 1452, 929 P.2d 253, 256 (1996); State ex. rel. City of Reno v. Boyd, 27 Nev. 249, 256, 74 P. 654 (1903); also see Hawaii Insurers Council, Id.; 71 Am. Jur. 2d §13, State and Local Taxation (2001).
13. As an “enforced contribution for the support of government” [quoting United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572, 51 S.Ct. 278 (1931); City of Gary, Ind. v. Indiana Bell Tel., 732 N.E.2d 149, 156 (Ind. 2000)].
14. Medeiros, supra, at 973 P.2d 745.