We have elsewhere discussed how the Legislature has instructed we construe the statutory powers a GID may exercise. Here we discuss how courts have instructed we construe statutes of all types which impact GIDs. Although there are a number of judicially recognized rules for interpreting statutes like these and others, here we discuss five (5) of particular applicability¹. And with that said,

“Plain Language:” Nevada courts begin their inquiry with a statute’s “plain language.”² Where the language is plain and unambiguous on its face, it is not appropriate to resort to any ancillary construction aids³.

Inserting Words or Terms Not There: Because it is improper to “insert into statutes terms or provisions which are obviously not there,” courts are “reluctant to second-guess the wisdom of a statute and (for this reason are)…unwilling to insert words…the court believes the Legislature left out, be it intentionally or inadvertently.”⁴

Verba Cum Effectu Sunt Accipienda (that’s Latin by-the-way): “If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect. (And) none should be ignored.”⁵

Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius (that too is Latin by-the-way): “The expression of one thing is (to) the exclusion of another.”⁶ Therefore, “when a statute limits a thing to be done (to) a particular mode, it includes the negative (insofar as) any other mode”⁷ is concerned.

Had The Legislature Intended: that which is not stated in a statute⁸, it certainly knew how to “express (the words)…in straightforward English.”⁹ Therefore, where the statute doesn’t, it means the omission was intentional!

Judicial Decisions From Other Jurisdictions: When a term is neither defined by a statute nor a local government’s highest judicial authority, and it “ha(s) an accepted meaning in the area of law addressed(, or)…it (has one which) may have been borrowed from another statute¹⁰…or it…had an accepted and specialized meaning at common law¹¹, the accepted meaning governs and the word or phrase is considered a technical term or (one) ‘of art.’”¹² And in the “absence of contrary direction(, it) may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, (and) not as departure from them.”¹³

Conclusion: Although there are well over thirty (30) judicially recognized rules for interpreting statutes¹⁴, here we have discussed but six (6) of particular applicability to the types of statutes which impact IVGID. Therefore, whenever there’s a question as to a statute’s impact upon IVGID and it is not answered by Dillon’s Rule, we need to resort to the judicially recognized rules of construction outlined above.

And now you know!

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1. Initially, we refer the reader to our discussion of The Powers a GID May Exercise. Although there are a whole lot more than five (5) rules or maxims, as aforesaid, here we concentrate on just six (6)!
2. See Arguello v. Sunset Station, Inc., 127 Nev. 365, 370, 252 P.3d 206, 209 (2011).
3. See State Farm Mut. v. Comm’r of Ins, 114 Nev. 535, 540, 958 P.2d 733 (1998); Erwin v. State of Nevada, 111 Nev. 1535, 1538, 908 P.2d 1367, 1369 (1995) [quoting Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Boulder City, 106 Nev. 497, 503, 797 P.2d 946, 949 (1990)]; and, Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 1298, 1302, 148 P.3d 790, 792-793 (2006).
4. See Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Gooding Cty., 159 Idaho 84, 356 P.3d 377, 382 (2015).
5. See CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION (adapted from Scalia & Garner).
6. This maxim has been expressly recognized in Nevada in SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 75, 334 P.3d 408, 414 (2014).
7. See Nunez v. Sahara Nevada Corp., 677 F. Supp. 1471, 1474 (D. Nev. 1988).
8. Such as GIDs be empowered to fix standby service charges for the availability of use of recreational facilities rather than the services it furnishes.
9. See dissent of Justice Stevens in FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 66, 111 S.Ct. 403 (1990).
10. In appropriate circumstances, courts will assume that “adoption of the wording of a statute from another legislative jurisdiction carries with it the previous judicial interpretations of the wording” [see Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 26, 65 S.Ct. 1 (1944)].
11. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-740, 109 S.Ct. 2166 (1989).
12. See pages 7-8 of the Congressional Research Service, Larry M. Eig, Specialist in American Public Law, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends (September 24, 2014).
13. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263, 72 S.Ct. 240 (1952).
14. See A Guide to Reading, Interpreting, and Applying Statutes.