As demonstrated elsewhere, the purpose of general improvement districts (“GIDs”) is to

“Provide various urban type services (to real property¹ in)…areas where such services (a)re not available and (cannot) be provided by general purpose government(s).”² In other words, counties, cities and unincorporated towns³.

And given GIDs are authorized to

“Furnish services pertaining to any such basic power which the district may exercise,”⁴

And they supposedly exist to primarily

“Serve…the inhabitants thereof and of the State of Nevada”⁵ rather than their employees and special interests,

These are the underlying justifications for those facilities as well as those programs and services offered thereat to exist.

So the question: may the District donate or give away public property, including public monies and free or preferred pricing at the District’s beaches and public recreation facilities, for any reasons whatsoever?

Staff’s justification for the massive philanthropy goes something like this:

As stated elsewhere, for decades unelected staff and “rubber stamp” Board trustees have taken the position that because IVGID “is a legally separate government…fiscally independent of any other governmental entity…(it is) not financially accountable (to) any other entity.”⁶ Our donations and preferred pricing benefits the community as a whole! Although there are public costs to which the beneficiaries of these favors benefit, since most are organizations made up of local parcel owners, in essence, staff’s philanthropy benefits the local parcel owners who are paying.

Since we disagree, we’re asking

Where in NRS 318 are GIDs expressly or by implication authorized to give away public property, including public monies and free or preferred pricing at the District’s beaches and public recreation facilities, for any reasons whatsoever?

And harking back to Dillon’s Rule⁷, should there be “any fair or reasonable doubt concerning the existence of (this) power, (why) that doubt is(n’t) resolved against the (District’s governing) board…and the power…denied?”⁸

Although counties and cities have limited discretionary power to donate money and public property for charitable purposes⁹, and nowhere are they empowered to donate or give away public property including money to anyone for any purpose, no such statutory authority exists when it comes to GIDs. Although NRS 318.210 instructs that

GID “board(s) shall have and exercise all rights and powers necessary or incidental to or implied from the specific powers granted in this chapter,” 

Strictly construed and limited¹⁰, where in NRS 318 is it declared that it’s necessary, incidental or implied that IVGID must donate or give away/discount use of public recreation facilities or property? The answer is nowhere.

Although we’re not aware of any court case which has ruled on the propriety of GID public philanthropy, we are aware of Nevada Attorney General Opinion (“Op. Nev. Att’y Gen.”) No. 2005-01 (January 21, 2005) which instructs that

The powers granted to local government are “in the nature of a public trust that may not be exercised…in the absence of statutory authorization.”

Therefore, without statutory authority, GIDs have no power to donate or give away any public property or money, or free or discounted use of any public property, to anyone for any reasons whatsoever! And since they have no such power, the same OAG opinion¹¹ instructs they have no power to delegate such powers to their GM nor to anyone else.

At the very least then, we submit we’ve demonstrated more than substantial doubt as to whether it’s permissible for staff to donate, give away, or discount public property, including moneys, for any reasons whatsoever. And following Dillon’s Rule⁸, it is our position the District has no such power.

And now you know!

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Conclusion: In our opinion it is a misuse of the NRS 318.197(1) (the power to fix rates, tolls and charges) to use the RFF/BFF and water, sewer and/or solid waste franchise fees local parcel owners involuntarily pay/guaranty as if they were taxes to pay for the donation and/or giveaway of the use of public facilities and money!

1. Consider that: NRS 318.258(9) instructs the services a GID “provide(s are those)…required by the owners of…real property;” NRS 318.197(2) instructs that “all rates, tolls or charges (adopted shall) constitute a perpetual lien on and against the property served;” NRS 318.201(10) similarly instructs that “the amount of the charges (elected to be collected on the tax roll) shall constitute a lien against the lot or parcel of land against which the charge has been imposed;” NRS 318.203 instructs that “where a dwelling unit (on a)…parcel of real property upon which the unit referenced…exists that is not currently being charged for services provided…the board…of trustees…may adopt a resolution…to charge the owner (of that unit)…for the services pr(fovided;” NRS 318.170(1)(b) instructs that “all owners of inhabited property in the district (may be compelled) to use (and pay for) the district’s system for the collection and disposal of sewage, garbage and other refuse;” and, NRS 318.201(1) instructs that when a “board which has adopted rates pursuant to this chapter…elect(s) to have such charges for the forthcoming fiscal year collected on the tax roll…it shall cause a written report to be prepared…which shall contain a description of each parcel of real property receiving such services and facilities and the amount of the charge for each parcel for such year.” In all of these examples it is the owner of real property who is charged for the services and facilities a GID provides to real property.
2. See ¶II at page 8 of Legislative Commission of the Legislative Counsel Bureau, State of Nevada (“LCB”), Bulletin No. 77-11, Creation, Financing and Governance of General Improvement Districts, September 1976 (LCB Bulletin 77-11).
3. In Nevada counties, cities and unincorporated towns are general purpose governments because each is granted general powers to provide for the health, safety and welfare of its inhabitants. Counties are vested “with the appropriate authority to address matters of local concern” [see NRS 244.137(6)]. “The term…matters of local concern (expressly)…include(s those addressing)…public health, safety and welfare” [see NRS 244.143(2)(a)]. Cities are vested with express powers to: “provide for safeguarding public health” [see NRS 266.330(1)], “provide generally for the public safety” [see NRS 266.277(1)], and regulate and license (see NRS 266.355) which encompasses statements attesting to the welfare of the community [see NRS 425.520(2)]. Unincorporated towns are vested with express powers to: provide for “public health, safety and morals” [see NRS 269.190 et seq.], and, “protect the public health and welfare” [see NRS 269.227, 269.128, 269.171(1)]. In contrast, GIDs are not expressly permitted to exercise any of these powers.
4. See NRS 318.100(2).
5. See NRS 318.015(1).
6. See ¶1(A) at page 35 of IVGID’s 2019 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (“the 2019 CAFR”).
7. “Historically under Nevada law, the exercise of powers by a board of (local government trustees) has been governed by a common-law rule on local governmental power known as Dillon’s Rule. Which is named after former Chief Justice John F. Dillon of the Iowa Supreme Court who in a case from 1868 and in later treatises on the law governing local governments, set forth the common-law rule defining and limiting the powers of local governments [see NRS 244.137(1) and 268.001(1)].
8. See NRS 244.137(4) and 268.001(4).
9. See NRS 244.1505 and NRS 268.028 which vests counties and incorporated cities with the discretionary power to expend money on behalf of nonprofit organizations created for religious, charitable, or educational purposes for a selected purpose as long as it provides a substantial benefit to the inhabitants.
10. See our How The Legislature and How The Courts Instruct We Construe Those Statutes Which Impact GIDs discussions.
11. Also see Op. Nev. Att’y Gen. No. 96-11 (April 25, 1996) which relies upon California Sch. Emp. A. v. Personnel Com’n. of P.V.U.S.D., 3 Cal.3d 139, 144, 474 P.2d 436, 439 (1970).