Only because the District tells us

The Recreation Facility Fee (“RFF”) and Beach Facility Fee (“BFF”) its Board adopts each year¹…represent fiscal year “Recreation…Service Charges” for “the availability of the use of IVGID’s beaches; boat launch ramp; Championship golf course; Mountain golf course; tennis facilities; the Chateau and Aspen Grove; Diamond Peak Ski Resort, and Recreation Center,”²

Do we tackle the question proffered.

We begin our examination by recalling that just because the District tells us its recreation RFF/BFF are “service…charges…for the availability of” facilities, doesn’t necessarily make them so. That’s because

“Courts will determine and classify (monetary exactions of all kinds) on the basis of realities,”³ looking to their “operating incidence”⁴ rather than (their) specially descriptive phrase(s).”⁵

So in order to determine those realities, let’s examine NRS 318 and look for the definition of “service…charge(s)…for the availability of” facilities. Nowhere is the term defined. What about anywhere else in the NRS? Same answer. Nowhere. What about in Nevada judicial decisions? To our knowledge, nowhere either. The simple fact of the matter is that unlike other charges general improvement district (“GID”) Boards are expressly authorized by NRS 318.197(1) to “fix, and from time to time increase or decrease,” there is no such thing as a “service…charge…for the availability of” facilities! Take a very close look at NRS 318.197(1). Although the reader will see where GID Boards are permitted to fix “charges…for the availability of service(s),” no similar power exists “for the “availability of” facilities.

Was this omission simply an oversight? or was it intentional? Given Dillon’s Rule⁶ tells us

A “governing body…possesses and may exercise only the following powers and no others…Those…granted in express terms by the Nevada Constitution, statute or…charter,”

The omission was intentional!

Moreover, the judicial rules for construing statutes⁷ similarly conclude.

It is improper to “insert into statutes terms or provisions which are obviously not there” because courts are “reluctant to second-guess the wisdom of a statute and (for this reason they are)…unwilling to insert words…the court believes the Legislature left out, be it intentionally or inadvertently.”⁸

Stated a bit differently, the reader is directed to the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius [“the expression of one thing is (to) the exclusion of another”⁹]. Therefore, “when a statute limits a thing to be done (to) a particular mode, it includes the negative (insofar as) any other mode”¹⁰ is concerned. Which is a nice way of saying that if the Legislature intended to include “availability of facilities” in the NRS 318.197(1) definition of the types of rates, tolls or charges a GID Board may fix, it certainly knew how to “express (the words)…in straightforward English.”¹¹ Meaning that as here, where the “statute limits a thing to be done (to) a particular mode,” it means the omission was intentional!

And now you know!

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1. See that staff memorandum typically accompanying its request the RFF/BFF be adopted and collected on the county tax roll (by way of example, see that May 30, 2025 staff memorandum in support of possible approval of a resolution approving the Report for collection of Recreation Standby and Service Charges for fiscal year 2025/2026) which recites that “each year, the District establishes a…Recreation Facility Fee and Beach Facility Fee.”
2. See ¶¶4 and 4(b) of Resolution No. 1917 as well as ¶I of the the Report For Collection on The County Tax Roll of Recreation Standby And Service Charges adopted May 30, 2025 which fixes these fees “for the fiscal year 2025-26.”
3. See Hukle v. City of Huntington, 134 W.Va. 249, 58 S.E.2d 780, 783 (1950); Clean Water Coalition v. The M Resort, LLC, 127 Nev. 301, 255 P. 3d 247, 256 (2011) citing State v. Medeiros, 89 Haw. 361, 973 P.2d 736, 741 (1999).
4. See Emerson College v, City of Boston, 391 Mass. 415, 424-425, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (1984),
5. See Stewarts’ Pharmacies v. Fase, 43 Haw. 131, 144 (1959) reh’g denied at 43 Haw. 166.
6. See our How The Legislature Instructs We Construe The Limited Powers GIDs May Exercise discussion.
7. See our How Courts Instruct We Construe Those Statutes Which Impact GIDs discussion.
8. See Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Gooding Cty., 159 Idaho 84, 356 P.3d 377, 382 (2015).
9. The applicability of this maxim is expressly recognized in Nevada [see SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 75, 334 P.3d 408, 414 (2014)].
10. See Nunez v. Sahara Nevada Corp., 677 F. Supp. 1471, 1474 (D. Nev. 1988).
11. See the dissent of Justice Stevens in FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 66, 111 S.Ct. 403 (1990).