Only because the District tells us

Its Recreation Facility Fee (“RFF”) and Beach Facility Fee (“BFF”) its Board adopts each year represent annual fiscal year “Recreation Standby and Service Charges” for “the availability of the use of IVGID’s beaches; boat launch ramp; Championship golf course; Mountain golf course; tennis facilities; the Chateau and Aspen Grove; Diamond Peak Ski Resort, and Recreation Center,”¹ and

NRS 318.197(1) tells us that general improvement district Boards have the power to

“Fix, and from time to time increase or decrease…recreational facilit(y)…rates, tolls or charges² other than special assessments, including, but not limited to “standby service charges, for services or facilities furnished by the district.”

Do we tackle this question.

So we begin our discussion by recalling that just because the District tells us its recreation RFF/BFF are “standby service charges,” doesn’t necessarily make them so. That’s because

“Courts will determine and classify (monetary exactions of all kinds) on the basis of realities”³ looking to their “operating incidence”⁴ rather than (their) specially descriptive phrase(s).”⁵

With that said, let’s examine NRS 318 searching for the definition of “standby service charges” as that term is used in NRS 318.197(1).

Nowhere is the term defined. What about anywhere else in the NRS? Same answer. Nowhere. So we’re relegated to searching elsewhere for the answer. And this takes us to the above discussions, as well as established rules for construing statutes⁶.

Dillon’s Rule instructs “that (a)…governing body…possesses and may exercise only the following powers and no others…Those…granted in express terms by the Nevada Constitution, statute or…charter.”

Similarly, Nevada courts begin

With a statute’s “plain language.”⁷ Therefore, where plain and unambiguous on its face, it is not appropriate to resort to any ancillary construction aids⁸.

Well these rules don’t help because as we’ve demonstrated, nowhere in the NRS is the term defined.

Where as here a term is neither defined by statute nor a local government’s highest judicial authority, and as we’ve demonstrated

It “ha(s) an accepted meaning in the area of law addressed(, or one which)…may have been borrowed from another statute⁹…or it…had an accepted and specialized meaning at common law¹⁰, the accepted meaning governs and the word or phrase is considered a technical term or (one) ‘of art.’”¹¹ In the “absence of contrary direction(, it) may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, (and) not as departure from them.”¹²

Although there are none in Nevada, there are several originating from our immediate neighbor to the west; California. And rather than reciting the particulars, the reader is directed to our What Are Standby Service Charges For…The Availability of Service and Facilities discussions. Which takes us to our What Are Standby Service Charges For…The Availability of Service and Facilities discussions.

And now you know!

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1. See ¶¶4 and 4(b) of Resolution No. 1917 as well as ¶I of the the Report For Collection on The County Tax Roll of Recreation Standby And Service Charges adopted May 30, 2025 which fixes these fees “for the fiscal year 2025-26.”
2. The term “rates, tolls or charges” represents different names for “specific services” for which “fixed price(s are) charged (see https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fee.asp). According to an AI search, a “rate is a fixed fee or cost per unit of service (often used for utilities like water or electricity); a toll is a fee paid for the use of a specific road, bridge, or tunnel, typically collected at designated points; and, a charge is a fee imposed for a service or product, which can vary based on usage or specific conditions.” The common denominator here being that all are fees!
3. See Hukle v. City of Huntington, 134 W.Va. 249, 58 S.E.2d 780, 783 (1950); Clean Water Coalition v. The M Resort, LLC, 127 Nev. 301, 255 P. 3d 247, 256 (2011) citing State v. Medeiros, 89 Haw. 361, 973 P.2d 736, 741 (1999).
4. See Emerson College v, City of Boston, 391 Mass. 415, 424-425, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (1984),
5. See Stewarts’ Pharmacies v. Fase, 43 Haw. 131, 144 (1959) reh’g denied at 43 Haw. 166.
6. See our How The Legislature Instructs We Construe The Limited Powers GIDs May Exercise and How Courts Instruct We Construe Statutes Impacting GIDs discussions.
7. See Arguello v. Sunset Station, Inc., 127 Nev. 365, 370, 252 P.3d 206, 209 (2011).
8. See State Farm Mut. v. Comm’r of Ins, 114 Nev. 535, 540, 958 P.2d 733 (1998); Erwin v. State of Nevada, 111 Nev. 1535, 1538, 908 P.2d 1367, 1369 (1995) [quoting Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Boulder City, 106 Nev. 497, 503, 797 P.2d 946, 949 (1990)]; Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 1298, 1302, 148 P.3d 790, 792-793 (2006).
9. In appropriate circumstances, courts will assume that “adoption of the wording of a statute from another legislative jurisdiction carries with it the previous judicial interpretations of the wording” [see Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 26, 65 S.Ct. 1 (1944)].
10. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-740, 109 S.Ct. 2166 (1989).
11. See pages 7-8 of the Congressional Research Service, Larry M. Eig, Specialist in American Public Law, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends (September 24, 2014).
12. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263, 72 S.Ct. 240 (1952).